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Hodge: Big Brother is Watching

BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING: LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE
OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Samuel D. Hodge, Jr.1

There was of course no way of knowing whether you
were being watched at any given moment.
- George Orwell, 1984
“Big brother is watching” is a phrase coined by George Orwell in his
novel 1984. This saying describes the government’s surveillance of its
citizens with electronic listening devices and cameras in a jurisdiction
where Big Brother is the head of a totalitarian administration.2 The phrase
depicts an attitude in which no one is beyond the reach of a prying
government that uses digital cameras with facial recognition software and
may result in the incarceration of anyone who opposes the regime.3
Penned by Orwell in 1947, the fictionalization was meant to provide a
forum to discuss “surveillance, police states and authoritarianism.”4 More
than seventy years later, the book has proven to be prophetic. The same
technological breakthroughs that have changed our lives have also
produced detailed records of our daily lives.5
To protect society against the dangers presented by terrorism, the
government has demonstrated a profound desire to secure as much data
as possible and to utilize that digital information for a variety of
purposes.6 This article will examine some of the innovations used by law
enforcement for observation and identification purposes, such as video
surveillance, drones, automated license plate readers, and facial
recognition software. Though each tool is different, the legal issues

1. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. is an award winning professor at Temple University where he teaches
law, anatomy and forensics. He is also a member of the Dispute Resolution Institute where he serves
as a mediator and neutral arbitrator. He is one of the most published scholars in medical/legal matters
and has authored more than 180 articles in medical and legal journals and has written ten texts
including The Forensic Autopsy. He also enjoys an AV preeminent rating and has been named a top
lawyer in Pennsylvania on multiple occasions. The author wishes to thank Nallely Barbosa, a recent
graduate of the Temple University Beasley School of Law and a teaching assistant for Professor
Hodge, for her invaluable research and editorial assistance.
2. Big Brother is Watching You, LITERARY DEVICES, https://literarydevices.net/big-brother-iswatching-you/ Z (last visited Nov. 28, 2019).
3. Id.
4. Matthew Feeney, Seventy Years Later, It’s Still ‘1984’, CATO INSTITUTE (JUNE 5, 2019),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/seventy-years-later-its-still1984?gclid=Cj0KCQiA2vjuBRCqARIsAJL5aKKoOpz0zDd5WcM2avykIIvE_pz4qeeI05VB_hPCBIgAaF7thCii1waAtgaEALw_wcB.
5. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1934 (2013).
6. Id.
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involving the various forms of digital technology are relatively similar.
I.

VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Members of society are observed through surveillance equipment in
many settings such as the streets, banks, casinos, stores, and shopping
malls.7 Routine monitoring takes place as we drive a vehicle or walk along
a sidewalk, thereby offering a comprehensive picture of our private lives.8
Roughly three-quarters of small businesses record those who enter their
premises9 and closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems even allow law
enforcement officials to detect, prevent, and investigate assaults and to
discover crimes against property.10
The first use of cameras for surveillance purposes occurred in England
in 1986 where the equipment was installed in a one-square-mile area in
the town of King’s Lynn.11 Today, England is the worldwide leading user
of closed-circuit monitoring systems with one-half million cameras in its
network. Several years later, a few cities in the United States, such as
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, followed England’s lead and
started installing surveillance cameras in public areas.12 For instance,
Chicago maintains about 3,700 surveillance cameras and has access to
more than 32,000 others which can be monitored at police districts, public
safety headquarters, and other law enforcement locations.13 The City also
utilizes cameras on police and fire boats, helicopters, SUVs, trailers, and
command vehicles.14 Nationally, the use of surveillance equipment is
even more dramatic. Approximately 30 million cameras are employed in
the United States filming 4 billion hours of footage a week. Needless to
say, Big Brother is watching almost everywhere and most of the time.15
7. JERRY RATCIFFE, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF PUBLIC PLACES (Center for Problem-Oriented
Policing, Response Guide No. 4, 2006), available at https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/videosurveillance-public-places-0.
8. Amanda Li, Top 8 Pros and Cons of Surveillance Cameras in Public Places, REOLINK (Aug.
28, 2019), https://reolink.com/pros-cons-of-surveillance-cameras-in-public-places/.
9. Ratciffe, supra note 7.
10. Qasim Mahmood Rajpoot & Christian Damsgaard Jensen, Video Surveillance: Privacy Issues
and
Legal
Compliance,
DTU
(2015),
https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/110934780/Video_Surveillance_Privacy_issues_
and_legal_compliance.pdf.
11. Cristen Conger, Do Police Cameras Reduce Crime, HOW STUFF WORKS,
https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/police-camera-crime.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
12. Id.
13. Scott Goldfine, 32K Surveillance Cameras Aim to Keep Chicago Safe, CAMPUS SAFETY (Oct.
31, 2018), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/technology/surveillance-cameras-keepingchicago-safe/.
14. Id.
15. James Vlahos, Surveillance Society: New High-Tech Cameras Are Watching You, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009), https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a2398/4236865/.
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This surveillance will only increase as the price of equipment falls,
making it feasible to assemble a heretofore unimaginable quantity and
quality of data.16 The bottom line is that society is moving towards an
environment in which a person’s every move and transaction is recorded
by a computer or system.17
These recorded observations are not limited to police use. Consumer
spending for home surveillance equipment, such as doorbell cameras, will
grow into a $9.7 billion industry by 2023.18 This development has
resulted in private outdoor cameras on homes becoming an emergent law
enforcement tool.19 For example, 400 police departments have partnered
with one doorbell camera company to gain access to its footage to assist
in solving home thefts, vehicle break-ins, and other crimes.20 The
widespread use of such equipment has also made it standard police
practice to search for video cameras in the area of a reported crime,
making them important tools for fighting criminality and gradually
supplanting neighborhood watch groups and its legion of invisible street
guardians.21
A.

Video Surveillance Equipment

Video surveillance equipment consists of a camera that is usually
hooked up to a recording device or IP network. This video data is then
arranged into a searchable database through biometric software, thereby
making the viewing process more efficient for law enforcement
purposes.22 The cameras can also be armed with motion-detecting
sensors, which vastly diminish the amount of data and further enhance the
efficiency of the viewing task.23 The equipment is now so sophisticated
that cameras permit users to take advantage of “satellite-based optics” that
allow the observer to see in the dark, visualize words on a page hundreds

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. T.J. McCue, Home Security Cameras Market to Surpass $9.7 Billion By 2023, FORBES
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2019/01/31/home-security-cameras-marketto-surpass-9-7-billion-by-2023/#3f3bea523c2b.
19. Watchful Help or Harm?: Police Access Home Surveillance Cameras To Solve Crimes,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE
(Sep.
30,
2019),
https://www.postgazette.com/opinion/editorials/2019/09/30/Home-surveillance-cameras-Ring-Amazonpolice/stories/201909280013.
20. Id.
21. Faith Karimi, Home Surveillance Cameras Are The New Neighborhood Watch, CNN (Aug.
31,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/30/us/home-surveillance-cameras-neighborhoodwatch/index.html.
22. Jack Giordano, VIDEO EVIDENCE: LEGAL STANDARDS & PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (2017),
available at 2017 WL 6944772.
23. Id.
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of feet away, and look into buildings.24
B.

Benefits of Surveillance Cameras

Surveillance cameras in public places have the benefit of identifying
the perpetrator of a crime.25 The Boston Marathon bombing provides an
example. The government was able to release images of the two suspects
from a surveillance camera installed on the outside wall of a department
store just three days after the attack.26 The technology can also provide a
feeling of enhanced safety. The cameras can visualize a large area or focus
on a specific location known for criminal activity. The technology may
even act as a deterrent in stopping an offense if the criminal knows that a
camera is filming the location.27 The footage can also protect the innocent
by preventing the police from identifying and arresting the wrong
individual.
In a legal setting, the footage provides a very strong piece of evidence
since it is nearly impossible to maintain that a suspect captured on an
image is not the perpetrator of the crime.28 Surveillance cameras can also
prevent fraud and made-up stories. For example, a video recording of an
alleged crime or motor vehicle accident can easily disprove a fraudulent
claim, thereby freeing up valuable investigative time.29
C. Criticisms of Surveillance Cameras
A variety of challenges have attacked the use of video surveillance
systems, including concerns about the databases that store the video
footage, the failure to enact standards regulating the retention and use of
the data collected, and the risk for geolocation tracking without necessary
oversight.30 Unfortunately, there is a paucity of laws on the use of
surveillance cameras in public places, and only a small number of
jurisdictions have enacted legislation to regulate these activities. New
York’s statute, for example, provides that law enforcement officials may
only use this technology as part of an investigation of suspected criminals
after obtaining a warrant from the court.31
24. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and The Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 220 (2002).
25. Li, supra note 8.
26. Id.
27. Security Cameras in Public Places: A Good or Bad Thing?, TITAN ALARM (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://titanalarm.com/security-cameras-in-public-places-a-good-or-bad-thing/.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Kimberly Winbush, Annotation, Use of License Plate Readers, 32 A.L.R.7th Art. 8, § 2 (2017).
31. Li, supra note 8.
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Surprisingly, the widespread employment of video cameras has not
reduced crime and its use is not embraced by all people.32 For instance,
one study revealed that closed-circuit camera systems did not generate
“enough bang for the buck.”33 While Federal and state governments have
spent millions to install and maintain these systems, the study
demonstrated that the equipment was underemployed and not properly
assimilated into police strategies.34
Another major criticism of video surveillance is its potential for abuse
by law enforcement. A story in the Detroit Free Press supports this
concern, revealing that law enforcement officials in Michigan used the
equipment to assist both themselves and their friends stalk females,
threaten motorists after traffic incidents, and track former spouses or
partners.35 The technology also raises privacy concerns, since
advancements in surveillance equipment often outpace changes in the law
regulating new developments.36
While Society is indeed exposed to serious security challenges, placing
cameras in public areas is not universally accepted as a method of
safeguarding the public. Cameras in public areas will inevitably film
innocent individuals who have no intention of committing a crime and
some feel that this constitutes an invasion of privacy.37 Some would rather
preserve their privacy than feel that “Big Brother” is watching their every
move.38
The Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against unreasonable
search and seizure, and additional safeguards are derived from legislation
and case law.39 However, it may take years before the courts or
legislatures address the thorny issues raised by privacy concerns, as new
developments in video technology continue to develop on a rapid and
regular basis.40 Questions are also expressed about how the footage is
being stored and protected, who has access to the images, under what
circumstances can it be retrieved, and whether it can be coupled with other
32. What's Wrong With Public Video Surveillance?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/whatswrong-public-video-surveillance (last visited Nov. 28, 2019).
33. Conger, supra note 11.
34. Id.
35. Id. In 1998, a police lieutenant From D.C. Was Criminally Charged For “Extorting Money
from Customers of a Gay Bar.” The Evidence Revealed That He Wrote Down the License Plate
Numbers of Those Visiting the Bar and Bribed Them into Paying Him Money by Threatening “To
Expose Their Lifestyle.” Lauren Fash, Comment, Automated License Plate Readers: The Difficult
Balance of Solving Crime and Protecting Individual Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2019).
36. Allyssa Nielson, Video Surveillance Threatens Privacy, Experts Say, DAILY UNIVERSE (June
28, 2017), https://universe.byu.edu/2017/06/28/video-surveillance-threatens-privacy/.
37. Security Cameras in Public Places: A Good or Bad Thing?, supra note 27.
38. Id.
39. Nielson, supra note 36.
40. Id.
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materials to create a profile of a person.41
D. Video Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
Video surveillance is one of the most intrusive types of searches
performed by the government,42 and the courts will consider the
expectations of society when measuring its constitutionality.43 One court
indeed observed that “[t]his type of surveillance provokes an immediate
negative visceral reaction: indiscriminate video surveillance raises the
specter of the Orwellian state.”44
Generally speaking, the courts have not deemed video surveillance of
a public area to be a search since the person being observed fails to have
a reasonable expectation of privacy.45 State v. Augafa provides an
example in which the court found that video surveillance of a public area
is not an invasion of privacy, nor is it a violation of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure.46 In Augafa, the
defendant was filmed selling drugs on a public sidewalk. Since this illegal
activity was observed in “open view,” no reasonable expectation of
privacy was applicable, and the surveillance was not within the ambit of
the Constitution.47 The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii noted
that a privacy test requires the court to decide “whether a person's
expectation of privacy under any particular set of circumstances may be
deemed reasonable.”48 A violation of the Fourth Amendment only occurs
when it can be shown that an actual, subjective expectation of privacy is
present, and that the expectation is one that society acknowledges as being
objectively reasonable.49
In another case, a federal district court found that the installation of two
video cameras by the police—one on a pole outside an apartment building
and one in a hallway—is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.50 As
noted: “The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”51 This guarantee is linked to the notion of a
common law trespass and considers whether the police secured
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
United States v. Cuevas–Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 251.
Id.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
State v. Augafa, 992 P.2d 723, 725 (Haw. Ct. App.1999).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.
Id.
United States v. Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 721, 727 (E.D. Wis. 2019).
Id. at 726.
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information by physically intruding upon a constitutionally
protected area.52 This concept was later transformed into one that protects
people and their reasonable expectation of privacy.53 In this regard, the
court held that a tenant does not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the common areas of an apartment building.54
Several courts have considered whether long-term video
surveillance of a house from a pole camera constitutes a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment.55 These courts have generally found that such a
practice is constitutional because “a pole camera only captures events that
a police officer or utility worker situated on the pole could see.”56 The
decisions have found that extended police observation from a pole camera
is deemed irrelevant to their “search” analysis.57 For example, in U.S v.
Houston, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that video surveillance
performed over ten weeks from a utility pole 200 yards away from a
property did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy
because the camera recorded the same view that a passerby would have
from the street.58 Since government agents could have been positioned
24-hours a day to watch the property, the fact that a camera was used to
conduct the surveillance fails to make it unconstitutional.59
A contrary result was reached in People v. Tafoya, where a Colorado
appellate court found it unconstitutional for the police to have placed a
video camera on a pole near the defendant’s house to surveil it over a
lengthy period.60 This camera continually observed the property,
including an area behind the owner’s fence, for more than three
months.61 Based on these prolonged observations, the police obtained a
warrant to search the defendant’s property where they found a cache of
drugs.62
The court acknowledged that it would have been permissible for
an officer to climb to the top of the utility pole and look over the
defendant’s fence with binoculars or with a telescopic camera. However,
it was improper to install a video camera that allowed the police to
perform continuous surveillance of the property, including the space
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 727.
55. People v. Tafoya, No. 17CA1243, 2019 Colo. App. LEXIS 1799, at *13 (Colo. App. Nov. 27,
2019).
56. Id. at *12-13.
57. Id. at *13-14.
58. United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282 (6thCir.2016).
59. Id. at 288.
60. Tafoya, 2019 Colo App. LEXIS 1799, at *25-26.
61. Id. at *1.
62. Id. at *1-2.
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behind the owner’s privacy fence, from the police station for more than
three months.63 The court opined that “unfettered use
of surveillance technology could fundamentally alter the relationship
between our government and its citizens.”64 This type of conduct, the
court determined, is inconsistent with an open and free society.65
A more difficult Fourth Amendment determination occurs when video
surveillance is conducted in a private setting. The following two cases
illustrate the problem. In Hernadez v. Hillsides, Inc., an employer was
found not to have committed tortious invasion of privacy when it set up a
hidden camera in the office of two employees to ascertain who was
viewing pornographic websites at night in a residential facility for abused
and neglected children.66 The California Supreme Court determined that
while a jury could conclude that the employer intruded upon the workers’
reasonable privacy expectations, the intrusion was not highly offensive or
egregious enough to violate prevailing social norms. Activation of the
video system was restricted to the night when the plaintiffs were
working.67
A contrary result was reached in Carter v. County of Los Angeles where
a hidden camera was placed in a fake smoke detector. 68 A report had
been made that one of the Department of Public Works’ employees had
engaged in a sexual act with a visitor in the dispatch room.69 A hidden
camera installed in that area captured inappropriate conduct by several
employees with visitors.70 The plaintiffs eventually discovered the camera
and claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure were violated by the secret recordings.71 A federal
district court agreed and noted that the employees’ belief that “they were
free from video surveillance was reasonable.”72 They worked in a secure,
private, and often solitary room that was used for work and off-duty
activities like eating and napping.73 While employers have many tools
available to investigate allegations of worker wrongdoing, covert
video surveillance is not one of them.74

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at *25-26.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *16.
Hernadez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Cal. 2009).
Id. at 1082.
Carter v. County of L.A., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (C. D. Cal. 2011).
Id. at 1045-46.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1050.
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II. AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS
The automated license plate reader (“ALPR”) is the most employed
law enforcement surveillance tool.75 The system consists of high-speed
cameras that photograph each license plate that passes by the devices 76
and operates on infrared and visual light spectrums so that the plates can
be read at all times.77 These readers can be placed anywhere from police
vehicles to stationary objects like poles, traffic lights, and overpasses.78
As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Hawkins:
A license-plate reader is a computer-controlled camera system installed in
some law-enforcement vehicles. The cameras, which are mounted to the
trunk of the vehicle, capture images of the license plates of cars nearby.
The system beeps to alert the officer that a plate has been captured, and an
image of the plate is displayed on the computer's screen.79

ALPRs can image about 2,000 license plates per minute on vehicles
going about 120 miles per hour.80 Apps are even available that permit beat
cops to scan license plates with their smartphones. 81 In turn, the images
are transmitted and analyzed by a computer that identifies the owner of
the vehicle, affixes a time and location stamp, and uploads the images to
a central server.82
A.

Police Use of ALPRs

ALPRs permit law enforcement to identify and record a vehicle’s
whereabouts in real-time and determine its prior locations.83 Generally,
the system will compare each license plate number against “hotlists” to
sound an instant warning when a match or “hit” appears.84 It can also

75. Dave Maass, The Four Flavors of Automated License Plate Reader Technology, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/04/four-flavors-automatedlicense-plate-reader-technology.
76. Id.
77. Kelsey D. Atherton, License Plate Readers Are Photographing You Everywhere, POPULAR
SCI. (June 27, 2013), https://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-06/license-plate-readersautomatically-create-big-data/.
78. You Are Being Tracked, ACLU 4 (July 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclualprreport-opt-v05.pdf.
79. State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St. 3d 94, 95, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577.
80. Justin Rohrlich, In Just Two Years, 9,000 of These Cameras Were Installed to Spy on Your
Car, QUARTZ (Feb. 5, 2019), https://qz.com/1540488/in-just-two-years-9000-of-these-cameraswere-installed-to-spy-on-your-car/.
81. You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used To Record Americans’
Movements, supra note 78, at 4.
82. Maass, supra note 75.
83. Id.
84. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 2.
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retrieve vast amounts of information from the National Crime
Information Center on vehicles and license plates, which in turn can
identify wanted persons, protection from abuse orders, missing persons,
gangs, suspected terrorists, and immigration violators.85
Other
applications include the ability to verify witness descriptions of vehicles
and identify cars that were near a specific site.86 In turn, this data can be
stored
for
weeks,
months,
or
years.87
Notably,
most license plate numbers imaged by these systems do not match stolen
vehicle lists and have no apparent link to any crimes, AMBER alerts, or
warrants.88 Studies estimate that the number of license plate scans linked
to a crime is only around 0.2 percent.89
B.

Legal Issues with ALPRs

The use of ALPRs creates legal issues because the data is stored on a
computer that is often linked with regional sharing systems, thereby
creating huge databases of driver location information. This information
is frequently retained and shared with others with few restrictions on how
it can be used.90 Critics maintain that this technology presents major
privacy and “other civil liberties threats.”91
The Fourth Amendment and its interpretation by the courts controls
how government officials can accumulate data obtained by ALPRs.92 The
litmus test for what constitutes an unlawful search was established by the
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States where the Court stated “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”93
The harm caused by one scan seems minuscule.94 The rub is that the

85. Julia M. Brooks, Drawing the Lines: Regulation of Automatic License Plate Readers in
Virginia, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 2019, at P3.
86. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Automated License Plate Readers (2016), available
at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-4-28_ALPR-Primer_Final.pdf.
87. Id.
88. Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Superior Court, 400 P.3d 432, 435 (Cal. 2017).
89. Stephanie Foster, Should the Use of Automated License Plate Readers Constitute A Search
After Carpenter v. United States?, 97 WASH. U. L. Rev. 221, 226-27 (2019).
90. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 86.
91. Id.
92. Scott Bomboy, Police Photos of Your License Plates and the Fourth Amendment, YAHOO! NEWS
(July 19, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/police-photos-license-plates-fourth-amendment132009696.html?guccounter=1.
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
94. Michael Fisher, Ohio Is Jonesing for Automatic License Plate Readers: Why This May Violate
Your Fourth Amendment Rights and What the Ohio Legislature Should Do About It, 64 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 329, 330 (2016).
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use of cameras coupled with the widespread sharing of that information
provides law enforcement with the ability to put together the separate
puzzle pieces of where people have been into a single, high-resolution
snapshot of their lives.95 Studies of jurisdictions that utilize license plate
recognition systems show that Fourth Amendment concerns are not out
of line. One study revealed that for every one million license plates
scanned in Maryland during one year, only forty-seven were theoretically
related to “serious crimes.”96 Even though many states have the same low
hit rate, law enforcement still collects and stores the data associated with
these non-hit scans.97 Therefore, license plate reader databases provide
the opportunity for institutionalized abuse by allowing anyone who has
access to the information to snoop into an individual’s daily activities,
habits, or present and past relationships.98
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation maintain that these systems permit local, state, and federal
agencies to follow the habits and locations of innocent individuals. They
further assert that this data gathering constitutes an invasion of privacy
and may be utilized to manipulate or exploit citizens if the surveillance
data lands in the wrong hands.99 ALPRs can also be utilized for
discriminatory targeting. A law enforcement official who manually
inserts information on a biased basis can check more license plates of a
particular ethnic or racial group than he or she would without the
technology.100
C. Court Decisions involving ALPRs
No reported decision exits on the validity of protracted location
tracking using an ALPR. However, there are several federal and state
court opinions that have determined that single-instance database checks
of license plate numbers do not qualify as searches under the Fourth
Amendment.101 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
U.S. v. Diaz Castaneda that a license plate check was not a search under
the Fourth Amendment.102 In this case, the police officer did not have any
reason to conduct the license plate check. Nevertheless, the court noted
that individuals do not enjoy a subjective expectation of privacy in their
95. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 2.
96. Fisher, supra note 94, at 331.
97. Id.
98. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 2.
99. Things to Know About Automatic License Plate Readers, PHYS.ORG (Sep. 15, 2015),
https://phys.org/news/2015-09-automatic-plate-readers.html.
100. You Are Being Tracked, supra note 78, at 9.
101. Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 86.
102. United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9thCir. 2007).
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license plates, and even if they did, the court concluded that society would
not recognize this belief as reasonable.103 License plates are visible on a
car’s exterior for anyone to see and are intended to provide information
about a vehicle to the police and others.104 It is not reasonable for a person
to believe that his expectation of privacy has been breached when an
officer sees what is visible and uses that information to check the status
of the vehicle and its registered owner.105
A chink in the armor occurred in Neal v. Fairfax County Police
Department when the Supreme Court of Virginia was asked to decide
whether “the retention of information gathered and stored by a
police department using an automated license plate reader” violated the
state’s Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act.106
This law is designed to “ensure safeguards for personal privacy by
government agencies.”107 The plaintiff maintained that the police
department’s use of license plate readers violated the provision that
information should not be gathered “unless the need for it has been clearly
established in advance” of collecting that data.108
Initially, the court noted that a license plate number by itself is merely
a mixture of letters and numbers “that [do] not describe, locate or index
anything about anyone.”109 However, the images and data linked to each
plate represent “personal information” as defined by the statute.110 The
pictures reveal not only the plate’s number but the vehicle and the
surrounding area. This data coupled with the GPS location, time, and date
when the images were filmed “afford a basis for inferring personal
characteristics, such as . . . things done by or to the individual who owns
the vehicle, as well as a basis for inferring the presence of the individual
who owns the vehicle in a certain location at a certain time.”111 Therefore,
it was logical to infer that the image and related data is “personal
information” as contemplated by “the legislature’s intent to remedy the
potential mischief posed by the extensive collection, maintenance, use
and dissemination of personal information and the potential for misuse of
such information.”112 The court remanded the case for further action
103. Id. at 1151.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dept, 812 S.E.2d 444, 445 (Va. 2018).
107. Id. at 339.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 346.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 346-47.
112. Id. at 347. See also United States. v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th
Cir. 1989); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous., 185 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
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consistent with its decision.113
One year later, the Circuit Court of Virginia reconsidered the issue.114
While the ALPR record-keeping procedure does not per se "identify
particulars" of a vehicle owner, it does permit law enforcement to link the
information with the identity of an individual.115 “In other words, access
to the license plate number stored in the ALPR system ‘permit[s]
connection’ to the identity of the vehicle's owner with a few clicks on the
screen, all from the driver's seat of a police cruiser.”116 Therefore, the
ALPR record-keeping process is a "passive use" as defined by the Data
Act and a violation of the statute.117 The court granted the plaintiff’s
request for an injunction barring law enforcement officials from
photographing and storing random license plate data unless the plate was
scanned according to “investigations of suspected criminal activity.”118
This decision has been hailed as a victory for data privacy rights
advocates in their battle over the utilization of digital technologies by the
police and other government officials.119
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,120 sixteen
states have enacted statutes on ALPRs: Arkansas,121 California,122
Colorado,123 Florida,124 Georgia,125 Maine,126 Maryland,127 Minnesota,128

Sparks, 37 Fed. Appx. 826, (8th Cir. 2002); and Hallstein v. City of Hermosa Beach, 87 Fed. Appx.
17 (9th Cir. 2003).
113. Id. at 350.
114. Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep’t, Case No. CL-2015-5902, Letter Opinion, Judge Robert J.
Smith (Apr. 1, 2019), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5805797/Opinion190401-Alpr-Petition-Granted.pdf.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Cathy Wu, Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department: Use of Automatic License Plate Reader
Violates Data Privacy Law, JOLTDIGEST (Apr. 22, 2019), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/nealv-fairfax-county-police-department-use-of-automatic-license-plate-reader-violates-data-privacylaw.
119. Id.
120. Automated
License
Plate
Readers:
State
Statutes,
NCSL,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-statutesregulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alpr-data.aspx (last visited Nov. 30,
2019).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Montana,129 Nebraska,130 New Hampshire,131 North Carolina,132
Oklahoma,133 Tennessee,134 Utah135 and Vermont.136 The specifics of
these laws differ depending upon the jurisdiction and objective of the
state.
Maine and New Hampshire have the most restrictive laws concerning
the use of ALPR systems.137 For example, New Hampshire’s law
prohibits the use of ALPR cameras and other systems that can determine
“the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle's
occupants on the public ways of the state.”138 However, cameras are
allowed for use in the operation of a toll collection system and when
related to the monitoring of a structure under the control of the state.
Arkansas follows a less restrictive approach, which disallows the use
of license plate cameras by public and private agencies but permits the
system to be employed by the police for ongoing investigations, by
parking enforcement entities, or for regulating access to secured
areas.139 The statute also allows law enforcement to keep the data for up
to 150 days unless it is part of an ongoing investigation.140
Other jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, only permit the use of its own
license plate database. However, a law enforcement agency may utilize
additional sources if the matter relates to an active criminal
investigation.141 That data must be destroyed within thirty days unless the
data is related to a criminal investigation. Utah does not allow data to be
stored for more than twenty-one days.142 Montana’s statute provides that
information gained by a license plate reader may only be used for official
law enforcement purposes to identify vehicles that are believed to be:
stolen; linked to a wanted, missing, or endangered individual; registered
to someone against whom there is an outstanding warrant; in violation of
commercial trucking laws; involved in specific criminal surveillance; part
of a major crime or incident; or in the vicinity of a recent crime and may

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fisher, supra note 94, at 343.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. §13.824 3(b) (2015).
MAINE REV. STAT. §2117-A(5) (2013).
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be connected to that offense.143
On the other hand, Florida’s law merely provides that an ALPR refers
to high-speed cameras combined with computer algorithms to convert
pictures of license plates into computer-readable data. In turn, the
Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Law
Enforcement, is tasked with creating a schedule for keeping records
containing pictures and data obtained through its system. This retention
must create a maximum time that the records may be retained.144
Despite the various statutory limitations on the use of ALPRs, courts
may not automatically suppress evidence or an arrest just because the
ALPR statute is not strictly followed or if system guidelines are not
properly followed. In People v. Davila, the Supreme Court of New York
in Bronx County noted that the New York City Police Department uses
an image-processing technology system mounted on the top of police cars
to automatically identify vehicles by their license plates.145 The plates are
then compared against a “hotlist” containing information about vehicles
that have been reported stolen, where registration or insurance coverage
has lapsed, or other similar violations of law.146 If there is a match, an
alarm sounds on the laptop computer mounted in the vehicle, notifying
the officer of the problem.147
NYPD guidelines consisted of a two-step process to safeguard the
reliability of license plate reader information. Initially, officers were
required to update the hotlist database with information from the last
twenty-four hours.148 If the alarm sounded, before “initiating any law
enforcement action”, the officer had to look at the database to make sure
that the plate reader information is correct.149 In Davila, the officer was
driving around in his patrol car but had not verified whether the hotlist
had been updated. A car then passed his cruiser and an alarm sounded
indicating that the car’s registration had been suspended.150 The officers
approached the car and thought that the occupants were acting
suspiciously. One law enforcement agent saw a bulge in the defendant’s
trouser area and found a gun.151 Upon questioning, the defendant claimed
that he had been in an earlier confrontation. After his arrest, the accused
moved to suppress the evidence related to the weapon.152 The court
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-117(2)(d)(v) (2017).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.0778(2) (West 2014).
People v. Davila, 901 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id.
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denied the motion and found that the officer’s failure to follow the
guidelines did not invalidate the police stop.153 According to the court,
the NYPD guidelines are merely suggestions for ideal practices and they
do not represent the law. The officer reasonably relied on the license plate
reader’s hotlist and the database was not “stale,” as the defendant
suggested. Rather, it had been updated only 36 hours before the stop and
accurately reflected the status of the owner’s car.154
Whether scanned license plate data is discoverable was at issue in
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. The
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.155 The American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) filed suit to obtain the ALPR data collected by the Los
Angeles Police Department for one week to ascertain if it showed whether
the police were using the information to target specific people,
neighborhoods, or organizations as well as to determine the degree to
which the technology was threatening individual policy interests.156 The
City objected to the request, claiming that the law allowed it to withhold
records that are part of an investigation as well as when the public’s
interest in disclosure is outweighed by the need to keep the information
private.157 The Supreme Court of California agreed with the City’s
position and prohibited the discovery of the data. The court noted that the
police department recorded between 1.7 and 1.8 million license plates a
week and kept that data for two years.158 Disclosing such material would
threaten the privacy of everyone affiliated with the scanned plates and the
sheer volume of material would make that threat significant.159 That data
would show the daily activities of its citizens, such as where they were at
a certain time, their employment location, home address, and places that
they visited.160 Therefore, the court ruled that the request was a situation
in which the “public interest in preventing such a disclosure, clearly
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of these records.”161
Carpenter v. United States warrants watching in the future because of
the potential impact of the decision involving surveillance conducted in
public areas.162 This case dealt with whether the “government conducts
a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell
phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user's past
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 791.
Id.
Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Super. Crt., 3 Cal. 5th 1032 (Cal. 2017).
Id. at 1043-44.
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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movements.”163 In every instance when a phone connects to a cell site, it
creates a time-stamped record dubbed “cell-site location information
(CSLI).”164 Wireless carriers retain CSLI for the start and end of
incoming calls and gather site information from the transmission of text
messages and regular data connections.165
Carpenter dealt with an incident in 2011 where four individuals were
apprehended as suspects in the robbery of several Radio Shack and T–
Mobile stores. Based upon a confession, the FBI reviewed the phone
records of one of the suspects, and this data and site sector information
placed him near the scene of several crimes.166 He was arrested and
moved to suppress the cell-site data provided by the wireless carriers,
alleging that the Government's seizure of the records violated the Fourth
Amendment because the information had been acquired without a warrant
based upon probable cause.167
In applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools,
the Court noted that it has sought to “assure preservation of that degree of
privacy against the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.”168 Because of the huge storage capacity of cell phones, the
police must usually acquire a warrant before examining the contents of a
phone.169 The instant fact pattern dealt with the Government's
procurement of a wireless carrier’s cell-site records revealing the location
of the defendant’s cell phone whenever he placed or received calls.170
This personal location information kept by a third party did not fit
precisely under any existing precedent so the Court was left to its own
devices.171
The Court held the use of CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment
violation, noting that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through
CSLI. The location information obtained from [the defendant’s] wireless
carriers was the product of a search.”172 A person does not give up all
Fourth Amendment protections merely by entering a public space.
Instead, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”173 Allowing
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 2211.
Id.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2214.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2217.
Id.
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the government to obtain cell-site records violates that expectation.174
Likewise, mapping a cell phone's position over many days affords an allencompassing log of the person's whereabouts. This information offers a
detailed glimpse into the individual’s life, showing his “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”175 Since obtaining CSLI
constitutes a search, “the Government must generally obtain a warrant
supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.”176 The
impact of this decision remains to be seen but it does offer safeguards
with certain data that is obtained from a public area.
III. POLICE USE OF DRONES
To some, perhaps the ultimate intrusion into one’s privacy would occur
if the police could take to the air to secretly conduct surveillance of their
citizens. That day has arrived with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(“UAV”) or drones. This aerial technology has become commonplace,
with 1.1 million UAVs being employed in the United States. It is
predicted that this number will triple to almost 3.5 million devices by
2021.177 The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College
determined that, as of 2018, as many as 910 state and local public safety
agencies have purchased UAVs with more than half of this number
belonging to law enforcement agencies.178
Police use of drone technology will only increase because of the low
cost of the equipment. A good drone costs about $3,000 and it can be
equipped with a very powerful zoom-enabled camera for another $3,000.
A police helicopter, on the other hand, costs anywhere from one-half
million to several million dollars.179 The cost to fly a helicopter is about
$200 to $400 an hour, not counting maintenance expenses.180 Comparing
the costs of these two types of aerial technology, law enforcement could
buy a fleet of 500 drones instead of one helicopter. This would allow them
to blanket a large area with UAVs that can follow people unnoticed from
thousands of feet away and employ software that can identify individuals
in an automated fashion.181

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2221.
177. Curt Fleming, Remote Drone Dispatch: Law Enforcement’s Future?, POLICE CHIEF MAG.,
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/remote-drone-dispatch/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
178. Jake Laperruque & David Janovsky, These Police Drones Are Watching You, POGO (Sep. 25,
2018), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/09/these-police-drones-are-watching-you/.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 3-4.
181. Id. at 4.
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UAV and Drone Equipment

Most advances in the development of drones occurred during periods
of war.182 These unmanned flying machines gained much recognition
during their use in military incursions in the Middle East following the
September 11th attacks. The government employed these devices to
perform surveillance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, in addition to
dropping targeted weapons.183 Because drones fly hundreds of feet above
the ground, they are usually undetectable by those being watched.184
These flying machines gained a domestic application in 2005 when
Customs and Border Patrol started using them to monitor the Canadian
and Mexican borders, detecting large quantities of marijuana and
cocaine.185
Surveillance UAVs have very sophisticated imaging technology that
offers the capability to acquire detailed images of individuals, terrain,
houses and even small objects.186 The drone cameras are usually high
definition and can provide live-feed video streams at a rate of 10 frames
a second. Some systems even allow the operator to follow more than 50
varied targets across a distance of 65 square miles.187 Because the units
can be equipped with thermal infrared video cameras, heat sensors, and
radar, drones can allow sophisticated and continuous surveillance 24
hours a day.188 They can also be coupled with cell-phone interception
devices, specialized software (such as license plate readers), facial
recognition software and GPS trackers.189
UAVs come in varying sizes from small quadrotors to large fixed
aircraft. They differ from manned aircraft due to their much smaller size,
reduced costs, ability to fly at low altitudes and easy deployment.190
Drones can be manually operated through hand-held devices with video
cameras so that the operator can view the area in which the device is being
employed. They can fly autonomously without the need for a person to
manually control the drone.191

182. Domestic
Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicles
(UAVs)
and
Drones,
EPIC.ORG,
https://epic.org/privacy/drones/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2019).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Jessica Dwyer-Moss, The Sky Police: Drones and the Fourth Amendment, 81 ALB. L. REV.
1047, 1048 (2018).
186. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182, at 2.
187. Id.
188. Drones/Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicles,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/dronesunmanned-aerial-vehicles (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
189. Id. at 1.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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UAV Use by Law Enforcement

Police departments routinely use UAV and drone technology as part of
their law enforcement arsenal.192 This application has moved past the
experimental phase and drones are being employed by law enforcement
in their day to day operations at a rapidly increasing pace. This usage has
increased by a staggering 518% just during the past two years.193
A variety of police drone applications exist, ranging from search and
rescue operations to crime scene analysis.194 For example, UAVs permit
the police to scour a location where suspects might be hiding while
keeping the surveillance as discreet as possible. Where police vehicles
can be easily spotted, a drone permits discreet observations while
safeguarding officers from danger.195 UAVs are very useful in search and
rescue missions because they can cover vast territories more quickly and
efficiently than officers on foot. They can also fly under trees, over water,
and between buildings—providing access that is not possible by a
chopper.196 Drones are even employed to help the police follow a suspect.
For instance, it is difficult for ground forces to keep track of a suspect
who has fled to a rooftop area. A UAV provides an eye in the sky that
relays key information about a suspect’s movements and directs the police
to optimal positions.197 Aerial devices can also help identify suspects,
ascertain what weapons they might be carrying, and assist in collecting
evidence that may be impossible to retrieve from the ground.198
Other applications include using a drone to obtain a three-dimensional
reconstruction of an accident scene, since the aircraft can obtain evidence
from angles that would normally be impossible to film without a
helicopter.199 UAVs are used to manage and observe traffic and to
determine why it is backed-up. This information can then be used to
detour traffic, change the rate of red and green lights to better manage the
flow of traffic, and detect speeding vehicles.200 Drones also have
applications following a natural disaster where it may be impossible for
vehicles to access the area and identify people in need of help. They have
192. 5
Ways
Drones
Benefit
Police,
DRONE
USA
(Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.droneusainc.com/articles/5-ways-drones-benefit-police.
193. Id. at 2.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Derek Wheeler, Police Drones (UAVs), DSLR PROS, https://www.dslrpros.com/policedrones.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2019).
197. Stephen Rice, 10 Ways That Police Use Drones to Protect and Serve, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenrice1/2019/10/07/10-ways-that-police-use-drones-to-protectand-serve/#e69d6f165806.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 4.
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even been deployed to manage large events such as the Super Bowl,
Spring Break parties, and the Daytona 500. This surveillance allows the
police to detect trouble before it becomes unmanageable and to redirect
their personnel to troubled areas.201
A recent trend in drone use arises in a business context. A growing
number of employers are utilizing UAVs to oversee their property and
workers on a customary basis.202 These applications include watching
workers believed to be engaged in the theft or misappropriation of
confidential information, viewing the performance and efficiency of
workers, and halting unsanctioned use of, or damage to, business
assets.203
C. Autonomous UAVs
There has been much publicity about industries, such as Amazon,
attempting to expand the commercial application of autonomous drones
by delivering their products. There are three major roadblocks to this
adoption in the United States: Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)
rules, limited flight time, and privacy concerns.204 The FAA has two
regulations that are obstacles to the full implementation of autonomous
drone operation: Beyond Visual Line of Sight (“BVLOS”) flight, and
Detect and Avoidance (“DAA”).205 BVLOS rules provide that an operator
must be able to visualize the drone at all times while in flight. This
directive would prevent autonomous or remotely directed flights. The
pilot provides a manned aircraft with a built-in system to detect other
planes in the area and to take avoidance measures when necessary. This
is difficult with a drone because the operator is on the ground, or, in the
case of an autonomous UAV, no pilot exits to “see and avoid” other
aircraft by taking evasive action.206 The second obstacle is that current
battery limitations provide drones with an average flight life of about 30
minutes.207 The last hurdle is one of privacy and the drone’s ability to
visualize areas that are normally not accessible to public view.208

201. Id. at 6.
202. Charlie Plumb, Drones in the Workplace: Tips for Handling New Technology, 24 No. 1 Okla.
Emp. L. Letter 3, January 2016.
203. Id. at 1.
204. Fleming, supra note 177, at 2.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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D. Criticisms of UAV and Drone Technology
Critics maintain that aerial surveillance undercuts the safeguards
imposed to prevent unreasonable location tracking and the government’s
accumulation of personal information.209 Drones present a unique
challenge for privacy rights.210 They provide the government with the
opportunity to track the movements of individuals and index participation
in constitutionally protected activities such as protests, political rallies,
and religious ceremonies.211 After all, inconspicuous drones permit the
police to spy on people from thousands of feet away with a high degree
of precision.212 Coupled with other automated identifying technologies,
such as license plate readers and facial recognition software, Big Brother
will be able to surveil people unnoticed, monitor their movements over
time, and identify them through a single image.213
These concerns are real, as demonstrated by research conducted by the
ACLU. The ACLU discovered that the FBI was using aerial surveillance
to record protestors, and sellers of the equipment were marketing drones
to law enforcement agencies by highlighting the drone’s capacity to
identify people at public gatherings.214 Drone cameras can even be paired
with facial recognition software contained in the FBI’s Next Generation
identification database or DHS’ IDENT, two of the biggest compendia of
biometric data in the world, thereby creating First Amendments perils for
political protestors.215
E.

Judicial and Legislative Responses to UAV and Drone Technology

UAVs usually operate in an area below the navigable airspace
regulated by the FAA, “in the vertical curtilage that is viewed as
belonging to a property owner.”216 This airspace was unregulated until
recently. Now, these unmanned aircraft trigger FAA law requirements, as
well as the property rights of landowners.217 In this regard, the
government, in June 2016, issued its first operational rules for customary
use of small, unmanned aircraft systems. The regulations provide safety
rules for drones that weigh less than fifty-five pounds and conduct non209. Laperruque, supra note 178, at 2.
210. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182.
211. Laperruque, supra note 178, at 2.
212. Id. at 3.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182.
216. Elizabeth Austermuehle, Drones and Private Property Rights, 34 No. 26 WESTLAW J.
AVIATION, 1 (2017).
217. Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones, supra note 182.
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hobbyist operations.218
Generally, UAV operators are required to fly their devices within their
visual sightline and regulations bar them from flying over individuals on
land who are not participating in the drone’s operation.219 This
dramatically restricts drone use over land that does not belong to the
UAV’s operator, but regulations do not expressly address the rights of
adjacent landowners who desire to limit drones from flying over their
property.220 In the absence of federal or state laws permitting these
unmanned aircraft to operate above private property without the owner's
consent, drones are not authorized to fly over these areas.221 Violators are
subject to suit by landowners who may enforce their rights through a tort
action, including trespass and invasion-of-privacy claims.222
In a criminal context, the Supreme Court of the United States has found
that citizens generally do not enjoy Fourth Amendment protections
against drone use because anyone might see what can be visualized from
the air.223 The weakness in this position is that the average person does
not use drones with the sophistication of those employed by the
government.224 State courts have also issued varying opinions on whether
UAVs violate a person’s privacy rights.225
Most jurisdictions do not require the police to obtain a search warrant
before engaging in drone surveillance. However, at least eighteen states
now require law enforcement in certain situations to obtain a warrant
before using a drone for surveillance purposes, while others have issued
civil penalties if drones take video or sound recordings of another without
obtaining that person’s consent.226 These jurisdictions include Alaska,
Florida,227 Idaho, Illinois,228 Indiana, Iowa, Maine,229 Montana, North
Carolina,230 North Dakota,231 Oregon, Tennessee,232 Texas,233 Utah,234
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220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Austermuehle, supra note 216, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Laperruque, supra note 178 ; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2016).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West 2017).
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5065/1-99 (West 2017) (repealed 2017).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 4501 (2015).
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 41.
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-29.4-02 (West 2015).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-903 (West 2019).
TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. §§ 411.062, §423.002(a), §423.0045 (West 2019).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-14-101 (West 2017) (original version at § 63g-18-101).
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Vermont, Virginia235 and Wisconsin.236
The first judicial pronouncements involving aerial surveillance arose
with searches conducted by traditional aircraft. In 1986 in California v.
Ciraolo, the Supreme Court determined that a search of a fenced-in
backyard conducted by air and without a warrant was allowed under the
Fourth Amendment. 237 The facts reveal that based upon a tip that
marijuana was being grown in the defendant’s secured backyard, a private
airplane was flown over the premises and an officer spotted the illegal
plants growing in the backyard.238 The police obtained a search warrant
and seized the plants. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence
of the seizure, claiming that aerial surveillance was a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.239 The Court noted that the defendant had the
subjective intent to maintain his privacy since a ten-foot-high fence had
been built around the backyard to conceal the marijuana crop.240
However, such a fence does not hide these illegal plants from police
observation by an officer standing on top of a truck or bus.241 After all,
the Fourth Amendment does not protect a person’s expectation of privacy
if the officer’s observations can be made from a public viewing point.242
In this case, the observations of the marijuana occurred within public
airspace. Society is operating in an era where aircrafts routinely fly over
property, so it is not reasonable to conclude that marijuana plants in
someone’s backyard are constitutionally protected.243 The police are not
mandated to obtain a warrant when they use public airways at an altitude
of 1,000 feet to see what is visible to the naked eye.244
The Supreme Court decided a second case during the same year in Dow
Chemical Company v. United States.245 Dow Chemical employed
elaborate measures to safeguard its property from the prying eyes of those
on the ground.246 Under a plant inspection, the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) hired a commercial aerial photographer to shoot a
picture of the plant from various altitudes.247 Dow maintained that these
235. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (West 2019).
236. See Drone Laws By State, CONSUMER.FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://consumer.findlaw.com/consumer-transactions/drone-laws-by-state.html; Laperruque, supra
note 178.
237. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
238. Id. at 207.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 211.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 213.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 215.
245. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
246. Id. at 227.
247. Id.
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pictures violated its Fourth Amendment rights by exposing trade
secrets.248
The Court started its decision by noting that Dow admitted that an
aerial observation with the naked eye, or the snapping of a picture from a
surrounding hill overlooking the facility, would not be constitutionally
protected.249 The issue was whether an aerial mapping camera of a large
industrial plant was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.250 In this
regard, the Court has noted that “the public and police lawfully may
survey lands from the air.”251 The pictures, in this case, were not so
detailed as to raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Although the images
indeed provided the EPA with “more detailed information than naked-eye
views, they remain limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and
equipment. The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”252
A third case reached the Supreme Court a few years later in Florida v.
Riley.253 The issue before the Court was “[w]hether surveillance of the
interior of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from
the vantage point of a helicopter located 400 feet above the greenhouse
constitutes a ‘search’ for which a warrant is required under the Fourth
Amendment.”254 The Court found that this search did not violate the
Constitution based upon its prior holdings. The judges were not impressed
by the low altitude at which the helicopter flew while making the
observations, since any member of the public flying in an aircraft could
have made the same observations.255 While these cases do not specifically
address the framework of surveillance conducted by a drone, they set the
foundation for the subsequent law in this area.
Westlaw searches involving drones and the Fourth Amendment or
drone surveillance by the police reveal only a handful of cases on the
topic. Several of the decisions involve pro-se plaintiffs.256 Byers v. State
of Indiana is a recent decision involving a woman who was mowing her
lawn when she discovered a drone in her backyard.257 She noticed a flash
drive attached to the unmanned aircraft, so she pugged it into her home
248. Id. at 232.
249. Id. at 234.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 238 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)).
252. Id.
253. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), reh’g denied, 490 U.S. 1014 (1989).
254. Id. at 447-48 (citing Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987), cert. granted, rev’d, 488 U.S.
445 (1989)).
255. Id. at 450-51.
256. This statement is based upon a Westlaw search conducted by the author on December 19, 2019.
257. Byers v. State, 134 N.E.3d 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), transfer denied, 141 N.E.3d 807 (Ind.
2020).
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computer and found footage of a woman, who she recognized as her
neighbor, handling a bag filled with white powder.258
The homeowner contacted the police and turned over the flash drive,
and the police then obtained a search warrant. A subsequent search of the
defendant’s home uncovered methamphetamine and a handgun.259 The
defendant was arrested and she moved to suppress the evidence obtained
as the result of the drone search under the Fourth Amendment.260 The
Court found the evidence was admissible since only four days had elapsed
from when the video was shot and the issuance of the warrant.261 At no
time did the defendant directly challenge the video obtained by the drone.
People have also been arrested for using drones to take unauthorized
images. For example, one of the first prosecutions for conducting
unauthorized surveillance through the use of a drone occurred in New
York when the defendant was arrested after taking images of a medical
building using his unmanned device.262 At trial, the defendant claimed
that he was using his device to take “videos and photos of the facade of
the structure” while waiting for his mother's doctor’s appointment to
finish.263 The defendant asserted that the drone's camera did not have a
zoom lens, the building's windows were tinted, and the video did not
reveal the inside of the premises. 264 Both the government and workers
inside of the office raised concerns about patient privacy, but the
defendant was found not guilty of the charges. 265
The opposite result was rendered in Wisconsin in 2015.266 In this case,
a drone operator was found guilty of five counts for the employment of
his unmanned aircraft “to harass residents in a…neighborhood.”267 The
facts show that the charges were filed in response to complaints by
neighbors that a drone was “flying near their windows and observing
them on their private property.”268 The defendant was convicted of
violating a law that made it illegal for an “individual to use a drone to
observe a person in a place where that person should have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”269
258. Id. at 1053.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1054.
261. Id. at 1056.
262. Rebecca L. Scharf, Drone Invasion: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the Right to Privacy, 94
IND. L.J. 1065, Summer 2019, at 1067.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1067-68.
269. Id. at 1068.
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Issues involving drone use have arisen in a civil context. F.W.T. v. F/T.
provides an example.270 This case entails a dispute between a father and
son concerning a long-standing quarrel between them.271 The purpose of
the lawsuit was an action by the son to obtain an order against harassment
because his father allegedly had someone fly a drone over his property
three times to hinder the son’s development of the land.272 According to
the law, such an action requires a showing that the conduct “caused fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage.”273
The court refused to grant the protective order and noted that there
was no evidence to show that the elements of the statute had been
satisfied.274 Merely flying a drone over, or trespassing upon, the land to
film a worksite does not rise to the level of harassment within the meaning
of the law.275 In no way did the court approve of the conduct of the father,
but it noted that the proper cause of action would have been a claim for
“nuisance, trespass or other cause of action, enforceable through”
equitable relief.276
Flores v. State of Texas presented a constitutional challenge to a
recently passed law regulating the utilization of drones.277 The evidence
demonstrated that drones have become increasingly popular by law
enforcement agencies for policing and surveillance activities.278 This use
has also expanded into the public sector for commercial, scientific and
recreational purposes. This has raised questions about privacy rights and
the legal use of drone-captured pictures.279 In this regard, Texas passed a
law making it criminal to use a drone to take images of other individuals
on their land. It further allowed the property owner to obtain injunctive
relief or monetary damages in case of a violation.280 The police, however,
enjoy an exception when they use drones for official activities, such as
the pursuit of a suspect, documenting a crime scene or taking pictures for
immigration purposes within twenty-five miles of the border.281
The plaintiff, in this case, was a resident of Laredo, Texas and his
property was within the twenty-five-mile zone. He filed suit to obtain
injunctive relief declaring that the border exception violated his rights
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

F.W.T. v. F.T., 101 N.E.3d 336 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
Id. at 338-39.
Id.
Id. at 339 (citing Seney v. Morhy, 3 N.E.3d 577, 582 (Mass. 2014)).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 340, n.8.
Flores v. State of Texas, No. 5:16-CV-130, 2017 WL 1397126 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2017).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy afforded by the
Constitution.282 As the plaintiff noted, this exception provides a
“playground for drone enthusiasts who would otherwise be precluded
from filming people in their homes, washing their cars, gardening in their
yard, or simply walking on their private property” to be observed without
any type of protection as long as they are within twenty-five miles of the
border, while everyone else in the state is protected.283 The court denied
the request on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the
law. It noted that standing requires more than an allegation of residency
within the zone.284 The plaintiff must show that an identifiable drone was
used to take images of him on his land. Mere generalizations and a
hypothetical injury are not enough285 and living within the twenty-five
miles zone was insufficient to establish an actual injury.286
In Allums v. Department of Homeland Security, a pro se plaintiff
claimed that the government was harassing him through a variety of
activities, such as showing up at his house to eat ice cream and stare at
him, as well as committing copyright violations of his work.287 In his fifth
count, Allums asserted that he had been the subject of drone surveillance
and attacks by the government, as well as agents telling him that he would
soon be “killing Americans with Drone Airplanes.”288 The plaintiff
maintained that these activities were carried out by agents who ordered
his execution by airborne devices that flew close to his head, causing him
to duck and fall to the ground.289 Not surprisingly, the court dismissed the
lawsuit for the failure to state a claim. The court considered the plaintiff’s
allegations fanciful and frivolous. There were simply no facts to support
his conclusory allegations that the government was surveilling him.290
IV. FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARE
Anonymity in the 21st Century is no longer an option since most people
now have some form of photo identification and surveillance technology
is constantly expanding. These developments have caused most members
of society to have had an encounter with facial recognition software
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at *4.
285. Id. at *3.
286. Id.
287. Allums v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 13-cv-00807 JSC, 2013 WL 4426258, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 14, 2013).
288. Id. at*3.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *6; see also Strong v. United States, No. 11CV2957 JLS (WVG), 2012 WL 202780 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 23, 2012).
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without their knowledge or consent. Facial recognition software refers to
equipment that has the dual role of “connecting faces to identities” and
enabling the “distribution of those identities across computer
networks.”291
Facial recognition technology (“FRT”) can be traced back to the mid1960s, when researchers first started working with computers to
recognize human faces.292 By the 1990s, automated facial recognition
algorithms were developed, and after the September 11th attacks, FRT
became part of the public discourse.293 The federal government invested
heavily in FRT, and millions of dollars in grants were awarded to state
and local governments to establish databases. What started as
government-funded research in computer sciences eventually made its
way into the private sector.294 FRT software is now employed by stores
to scan the faces of customers and pre-identify shoplifters and people
known to file lawsuits.295 Some airlines use FRT to speed up the boarding
process.296 Microsoft has even created a billboard that recognizes people
as they walk by and then deploys personalized ads associated with the
individual’s buying history.297
FRT is linked to a database of images, such as mugshots, government
issued identification photos (such as drivers licenses and passports), and
social media accounts to rapidly identify people through biometrics to
match key facial features, such as the distance between the eyes and the
gap between the forehead and chin.298 These measurements then create a
“facial signature” that is linked to a mathematical formula and compared
to a database of stored images.299 As one might imagine, FRT is a much
in-demand law enforcement tool for solving crimes by ascertaining the
identity of the offenders who are imaged on surveillance footage, locating

291. Kelly A. Gates, Our Biometric Future: Facial Recognition Technology and the Culture of
Surveillance 15 (N.Y. Univ. Press, 2011).
292. Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, HOW STUFF WORKS
1, https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facial-recognition.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2020).
293. Gates, supra note 292, at 27 (noting that proponents of FRT suggested that this technology
could have prevented the hijackings).
294. Id.
295. Ben Sobel, Facial Recognition Technology is Everywhere. It May Not be Legal, WASH. POST
(June 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/06/11/facialrecognition-technology-is-everywhere-it-may-not-be-legal/?arc404=true.
296. Francesca Street, How Facial Recognition is Taking Over Airports, CNN (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/airports-facial-recognition/index.html.
297. Id.
298. Nicole Martin, The Major Concerns around Facial Recognition Technology, FORBES (Sept.
25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemartin1/2019/09/25/the-major-concerns-aroundfacial-recognition-technology/#235792e84fe3.
299. Id.
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fugitives in a crowd, or locating terrorists as they enter the country.300
Other suggested applications include spotting problem gamblers in
casinos, greeting guests at hotels or on ships, linking people on dating
websites, identifying underage drinkers, and helping take attendance at
schools.301
A.

How Does FRT Work?

Some people have the innate ability to remember a face. This
recognition occurs because the individual can retain identifying
information about the facial features such as the eyes, nose, mouth, and
how those features come together to form a familiar pattern.302 Facial
recognition systems work similarly, albeit on an algorithmic scale. Where
a person visualizes a face, FRT recognizes data that is stored and can be
easily accessed. In this regard, 50% of adults in the United States have
their pictures warehoused in one or more facial-recognition databases that
law enforcement agencies can search.303 Matching a picture to a person
generally works in the following way:
• The first step requires that a person’s face be captured.304
Traditionally, this mandates the captured picture to be of a face
looking directly at the camera, with only a slight change in light
or facial expression from the database image.305
• A template for FRT is then made, which consists of measurements
of facial characteristics, such as the distance between the eyes, the
width of the mouth or depth of the eye sockets. These landmarks
are dubbed nodal points, and the measurements are inputted into
a template with a distinctive code.306 Every face has about 80
nodal points.307
• These nodal points are then analyzed, and the software will
compare the template of the person’s face to those stored in a
database to search for a potential match.308

300. Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where Will it Take Us?,
A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justicemagazine/2019/spring/facial-recognition-technology/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).
301. Id.
302. Steve Symanovich, How Does Facial Recognition Work?, U.S.NORTON.COM,
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-how-facial-recognition-software-works.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2020).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Bonsor, supra note 293, at 2.
306. Symanovich, supra note 303.
307. Bonsor, supra note 293, at 2.
308. Hamann, supra note 301.
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The chances of law enforcement officials finding a match are high
since more 117 million Americans have facial pictures stored in one or
more government databases and the FBI has access to 412 million
images.309 In fact, FBI facial recognition searches now outnumber courtordered wiretaps.310
B. Advantages of FRT
FRT has multiple applications and offers a variety of benefits that vary
depending upon the user. For instance, governments internationally use
FRT in police, military, and intelligence operations, and businesses use
FRT in security, advertising, banking, sales, and health care.311 One of
FRT’s most important benefits, however, is that it can make law
enforcement operations much more efficient.
Officials can submit a photograph of a recently apprehended individual
through its system to identify the person and ascertain if there are
outstanding warrants for other offenses.312 It can help officers in the field
observing a large gathering, like a sporting event or political rally, identify
people of interest, known terrorists, and wanted criminals.313 It is also
being used to ensure efficient regulation. The New York Department of
Motor Vehicles, for instance, has used FRT to detect fraudulent
licenses314 and the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office in Florida uses it to
identify inmates at the time of booking and release.315
FRT offers a faster way to process individuals without stopping each
person to ask for identification. The system can even be used as an
alternative for a password to access computers316 or to gain entry into a
building or secured location. Since no passwords are needed with facial
recognition, there is nothing that a hacker or thief could compromise. This
would prevent someone from using a stolen identification for

309. Symanovich, supra note 303.
310. Clare Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America,
PERPETUALLINEUP.ORG 2 (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/background.
311. Ashley Deeks & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Facial Recognition Software: Costs and Benefits,
LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-software-costs-andbenefits.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1-2.
314. Anthony M. Carter, Facing Reality: The Benefits and Challenges of Facial Recognition for the
NYPD 58 (Sept. 2018) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (available online),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=818128.
315. Id.
316. 6 Benefits of Facial Recognition Everyone Should Know, Tech. BUS. GUIDE,
https://techbusinessguide.com/benefits-facial-recognition-everyone-should-know/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2020).
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impersonation purposes.317 It is also favored over fingerprint scanning
due to its non-contact process. The possible disadvantages of dealing with
fingerprint identification methods, such as germs or smudges, will be
eliminated.318 It can even eliminate time fraud by employees. Facial
recognition will prevent a co-worker from time-stamping someone else’s
attendance or timesheets since each person must pass a face-scanning
device to check in and out of work.319
A lesser-known advantage of FRT is its ability to find missing persons.
For instance, police in China were able to find a missing six-year-old by
using a picture that had been taken days earlier with cameras linked to
FRT.320 New Delhi authorities reported finding nearly 3,000 missing
children within days of launching a facial recognition program.321 Aside
from leading to breakthroughs in missing children cases, FRT has also led
to breakthroughs in cases involving the mentally ill. For instance, a
mentally ill man who had been in a Chinese hospital for over a year was
reunited with his family. The hospital had been unable to identify him,
but a facial recognition firm was able to do so by linking a picture of his
face with public records.322 These success stories suggest that FRT could
be an essential tool in helping vulnerable populations.
C. Technological Limitations of FRT
FRT has certain limitations. This was revealed following the Boston
Marathon bombings, which showed that the FBI lacked the appropriate
software and databases to immediately identify the suspects.323 While
government databases contained the pictures of both Boston Marathon
bombings suspects, the software could not match the surveillance footage
to these database images.324 Although FRT has become increasingly
accurate, certain factors will still yield false positives, false negatives, or,
as in this case, undetected faces.325 These influences include the
sophistication of the camera, distance, database size, algorithm, and
317. Id.
318. PROS AND CONS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, RTI, HTTPS://WWW.1RTI.COM/PROSCONS-OF-FACIAL-RECOGNITION-TECHNOLOGY/ (LAST VISITED FEB. 10, 2020).
319. Pros and Cons of Facial Recognition Technology for Your Business, UPWORK (Dec. 27, 2017),
https://www.upwork.com/hiring/for-clients/pros-cons-facial-recognition-technology-business/.
320. Carter, supra note 315.
321. Rob Watts, Facial Recognition as a Force of Good, BIOMETRIC TECH. TODAY, March 2019.
322. Anthony Cuthbertson, Facial Recognition Technology Reunites Lost Man with His Family,
INDEP. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facialrecognition-reunite-family-man-lost-china-tech-mental-health-a8312161.html.
323. Jeffrey Edgell, Four Limitations of Facial Recognition Technology, FED TECH (Nov. 22,
2013), https://fedtechmagazine.com/article/2013/11/4-limitations-facial-recognition-technology.
324. Id.
325. Carter, supra note 315.
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the subject’s race and gender.326
There are several limitations to FRT. Poor image quality will limit
the effectiveness of FRT since it affects the usefulness of facialrecognition algorithms. This is an inherent problem because the quality
of a scanning video is much lower than that of a digital camera.327 The
comparative dimensions of the face with the image size also influence
how well the face will be identified. Therefore, small image sizes cause
facial recognition difficulties.328 The angle of the target’s face to the
camera is another factor that significantly impacts the recognition score.
The more direct the face is to the camera, the higher the resolution of the
image becomes, and a higher score is achieved for a resulting match.
Accuracy rates also drop as the number of pictures in a database increases.
This is because the database is likely to have images of people that look
very similar, leading the algorithm to pick the wrong person.329
The accuracy of automated facial recognition algorithms also depends
upon the subject. The faces of individuals change over time, which can
throw off the algorithm in identifying a person from an earlier picture.
Additionally, changes that happen from one day to the next, such as
hairstyles and facial expressions, can lead to improper identification.330
Finally, accuracy rates are lower in certain demographics. Facial
recognition algorithms have been less successful with minorities, women,
and young adults than Caucasians, men, and older adults.331 This is
because facial-recognition algorithms were trained on databases that
mostly contained pictures of white males.332 As a result, one study found
that there is an error rate of around 31% when identifying the gender of
women with dark skin.333
Accuracy is important when a person’s civil and liberty interests are
involved, which is why FRT vendors advertise accuracy rates of over
95%.334 However, this figure must be questioned when it is followed by
326. Jake Laperruque, Unmasking the Realities of Facial Recognition, POGO (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/12/unmasking-the-realities-of-facial-recognition/.
327. Edgell, supra note 324.
328. Id.
329. See Garvie et al., supra note 311. (noting that sixteen states allow the FBI to access their
driver’s license and ID databases).
330. Hamann & Smith, supra note 301.
331. Garvie et al., supra note 311.
332. See Jieshu Wang, What’s in Your Face? Discrimination in Facial Recognition Technology, 30
(Apr. 13, 2018) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University) (available online),
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1050752/Wang_georgetown_00
76M_14043.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (“It is estimated that in one widely used FRT training
dataset, 75% are male, and over 80% are white.”).
333. The Limits of Facial Recognition Technology, NEW HUMANIST (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/5419/the-limits-of-facial-recognition-technology.
334. Edgell, supra note 324.
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the disclaimer: “[This company] makes no representation or warranties as
to the accuracy and reliability of the product in the performance of its
facial recognition.”335 Even less reassuring is the fact that law
enforcement is not required to perform independent testing to determine
the accuracy of the FRT it uses.336 While the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (“NIST”) conducts voluntary tests of FRT
every four years, many law enforcement entities do not participate in
these audits.337 Some law enforcement entities recognize that FRT is not
flawless, so they have a human verify the results. 338 However, this
additional step does not guarantee accuracy, since people tend to be good
at recognizing familiar faces but have difficulty recognizing unfamiliar
faces.339 Inaccuracies are equally prevalent in the private sector.
D. Legislative Responses to FRT
Some legislatures have passed laws that limit the use of FRT and courts
have interpreted these laws to require warrants and other protections.340
However, Congress has yet to enact federal legislation that directly
regulates FRT. This is a major concern among citizens because of
questions about the technology’s accuracy and whether there is built-in
bias and misinformation in these systems.341 Nevertheless, FBI facial
recognition systems are governed primarily by two statutes: the Privacy
Act of 1974342 and the E-Government Act of 2002.343 These statutes
require that the FBI conduct Privacy Impact Assessments (“PIA”s) of its
biometric programs and that it employ Fair Information Practices
Principles (“FIPPS”).344 PIAs analyze how personal identifiable
information is handled in electronic systems and determine the risk of

335. Id.
336. Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias
Problem,
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
7,
2016),
https://apexart.org/images/breiner/articles/FacialRecognitionSoftwareMight.pdf.
337. Id.
338. John D. Woodward, et al., Biometrics: A Look at Facial Recognition, RAND 13,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB396.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
339. Id. at 11. (explaining that in a British study conducted at a supermarket, 34% of the cards
accepted by trained supermarket cashiers had a picture of a person that did not look like the shopper
and 7% of the rejected cards contained a picture of the actual shopper).
340. Garvie et al., supra note 311.
341. Martin, supra note 299, at *2.
342. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2014).
343. 44 U.S.C. § 101 (1996); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq (2002); Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum,
Now You See Me, Now You Still Do: Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of
Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 105 (2020).
344. Id. at 105-06.
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collecting, maintaining, and disseminating this information.345
Meanwhile, FIPPs highlight the importance of transparency, consent,
limited use, data quality, data minimization, security, and accountability
when dealing with personal identifiable information. 346
Efforts to implement laws that specifically target FRT use are
underway. Last year, the House of Representatives passed an amendment
to the Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2020,347 which
would require that the Director of National Intelligence report FRT use,
accuracy, policies, and its potential impact on constitutional rights.348
Meanwhile, two Senators have introduced the Facial Recognition
Technology Warrant Act, which would require federal law enforcement
to obtain a warrant to use FRT for tracking the movements of a person for
more than three days.349 Other recently proposed bills include the
Algorithmic Accountability Act,350 the Commercial Facial Recognition
Privacy Act,351 the No Biometric Barriers Act,352 the FACE Protection
Act353, and H.R.3875.354 The Algorithmic Accountability Act would
require that entities storing personal information conduct impact
assessments of their automated decision systems.355 The Commercial
Facial Recognition Privacy Act would prohibit commercial entities from
using FRT to identify consumers without their consent.356 The No

345. Department of Justice /FBI Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/information-management/foipa/privacy-impact-assessments
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2020).
346. National Domestic Communications Assistance Center: Executive Board Meeting, FBI (Sept.
21,
2016),
https://ndcac.fbi.gov/file-repository/2016-september-fair-information-practiceprinciples.pdf/view.
347. See HPSCI Fact Sheet on H.R. 3494 Fiscal Year 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fact_sheet_on_2020_iaa.pdf.
348. See Amendment to Rules Committee (July 15, 2019), https://amendmentsrules.house.gov/amendments/JAYAPA_066_xml71519135205525.pdf; see also Oakland Approves
Face Recognition Surveillance Ban as Congress Moves to Require Government Transparency,
ACLU (July 17, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/oakland-approves-face-recognitionsurveillance-ban-congress-moves-require-government (noting that the ACLU is now urging
Congress to vote in favor of this amendment).
349. See Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act of 2019, S.2878, 116th Cong. (2019).
350. See Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019).
351. See Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S.847, 116th Cong. (2019).
352. See No Biometric Barriers to Housing Act of 2019, H.R. 4008, 116th Cong. (2019).; Inioluwa
Raji et al., Saving Face: Investigating the Ethical Concerns of Facial Recognition Auditing, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 145 (Feb.
2020), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.00964.pdf.
353. See FACE Protection Act of 2019, H.R.4021, 116th Cong. (2019).
354. See To prohibit Federal funding from being used for the purchase or use of facial recognition
technology, and for other purposes, H.R.3875, 116th Cong. (2019).
355. See H.R. 2231.
356. See S. 847.
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Biometric Barriers Act would bar FRT use in public housing357 and the
FACE Protection Act would prohibit federal agencies from applying FRT
to government-issued IDs without a court order.358 Finally, H.R.3875
would prohibit using federal funds to purchase and utilize FRT.359
On the state level, California, Oregon, and New Hampshire have
started to regulate FRT use in the public sector by banning the use of FRT
in police body cameras.360 Several states have also enacted laws to
regulate FRT outside of law enforcement. Illinois passed the Biometric
Information Privacy Act, which sets up significant restrictions on how
private companies obtain and use an individual’s biometric data.361 This
law requires firms that collect information to notify the person that his or
her biometric profile is going to be collected, provide the reason for the
collection, explain the length of time the information is to be collected,
retained, and used, create a written, publicly available policy that details
a retention schedule, and secure a written release from the person before
collecting any biometric information or sharing the biometric data with
another entity.362 The Act also creates a private cause of action, allowing
individuals to bring a suit for a mere violation of the law.363
New York enacted the Stop Hacks and Improve Electronic Data
Security (“SHIELD”) Act, which became effective on March 21, 2020.364
The SHIELD Act requires businesses to implement protections for the
"private information" of New York residents and expands the state’s
security breach notification requirements.365 The SHIELD Act states that
any business that stores the private information of New York residents,
such as biometrics and driver’s license information, must "develop,
implement, and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect the security,

357. See H.R. 4008.
358. See H.R.4021.
359. See H.R.3875.
360. Benjamin Hodges & Kelly Mennemeier, The Varying Laws Governing Facial Recognition
Technology, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/28/varyinglaws-governing-facial-recognition-technology/id=118240/. See also Assemb. Bill 1215, 2019-2020
Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2019). (California law prohibiting the use of FRT in body worn cameras until
January 2023); H.R. 2571, 78th Or. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).(Oregon law prohibiting
the use of FRT to analyze body worn camera recordings); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 105-D:2 (2016).
(New Hampshire law prohibiting the use of FRT to analyze body worn camera recordings).
361. Hodges & Mennemeier, supra note 361.
362. Landmark Ruling on the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, WINSTON & STRAWN
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/landmark-ruling-on-the-illinoisbiometric-information-privacy-act.html.
363. Id.
364. Philip Gordon & Jennifer Taiwo, The New York SHIELD Act: What Employers Need to Know,
SHRM (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-andlocal-updates/pages/new-york-shield-act.aspx.
365. ID.
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confidentiality, and integrity of the private information."366 Unlike the
law in Illinois, the SHIELD Act does not create a private cause of action.
Instead, it enables the state's attorney general to enforce the mandates.367
Texas has a privacy act that forbids obtaining a person’s biometric
identifiers for commercial purposes unless the individual is first provided
with notice and consents to the use. The state also limits the sale or
disclosure of a person’s biometric identifiers except under specific
conditions.368 Washington has a biometric protection law that bars any
business or person from inputting biometric data into a database without
giving notice, obtaining the person’s consent, and offering a way to
prevent subsequent use of the information for a commercial purpose.369
Other similar state mandates include: 1) New Hampshire’s statute
prohibiting the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) from using FRT
when taking and retaining pictures,370 2) Maine’s statute requiring state
officials to issue rules that limit FRT use in drones,371 3) Washington’s
law requiring the DMV to notify license applicants that FRT may be used
to verify their identities and restricting the disclosure of results372 and 4)
Missouri’s statute prohibiting the Department of Revenue from using
FRT to produce a license or identify licensees.373
The number of states regulating FRT is likely to grow since the
legislatures of eleven other states have introduced bills limiting FRT-use
in both the public and private sectors. These states are Idaho,374
Indiana,375 Maryland,376 Massachusetts,377 Michigan,378 Minnesota,379
Nebraska,380 New Jersey,381 South Carolina,382 Vermont,383 and
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. State Biometric Privacy Legislation: What You Need to Know, THOMPSON HINE(Sept. 5,
2019), https://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/state-biometric-privacy-legislation-what-youneed-to-know
369. Id.
370. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:40-b (2014).
371. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tt. 25, § 4501(5)(D) (2015).
372. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.037(3) (West 2012).
373. MO. REV. STAT. § 302.170 (2019).
374. H.R. 492, 65th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Id. 2020).
375. H.R. 1238, 121st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (In. 2020).
376. S. 613, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); see also S.46, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020).
377. S.1385, 191st Gen. Court (Ma. 2019). ; S. 1429, 191st Gen. Court (Ma. 2019); H.R. 1538,
191st Gen. Court (Ma. 2019).
378. S. 342, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (Mich. 2019); H.R. House 4810, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (Mich.
2019).
379. S.1430, 91st Leg. (Minn. 2019); H.R. 1236, 91st Leg. (Minn. 2020).
380. S.746, 160th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2020).
381. S.116, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020); G.A. 1210, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
382. H.R. 4709, 123rd Sess. (S.C. 2020).
383. H.R. 470, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); H.R. 595, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2020).
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Virginia.384 Some cities have also started taking matters into their own
hands. San Francisco, Oakland, and Somerville have passed ordinances
that prohibit local authorities from using FRT.385 In an unusual move,
Portland, Oregon is taking steps to become the first city to ban both law
enforcement and private entities from using FRT.386 Finally, some law
enforcement entities have voluntarily limited their use of FRT. For
instance, the Seattle Police Department has stopped using FRT because
of apprehension over bias and inaccurate results and the Detroit Police
Department will only allow the utilization of FRT when it appears
reasonably likely to help in the investigation of a violent crime.387 The
Utah Department of Public Safety has also placed restrictions on FRT in
active criminal cases, and Portland, Oregon will likely soon follow suit.388
E.

How Can the Defense Recognize a Facial Recognition Case

Facial identification obtained through a software application cannot be
used in court as substantive evidence since the technology is not able to
conclusively match a picture to an identity and there continue to be
accuracy issues. Therefore, facial identification is not a scientifically
reliable tool that can overcome a Frye or Daubert challenge.389 At
present, the technology should only be employed to develop leads in an
investigation so its disclosure to defense counsel might not always be
forthcoming.390 As noted in People v. Carrington, “law enforcement
[does] not use facial recognition technology as the sole basis to identify
384. H.R.J. Res. 59, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020).
385. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance 107-19 (May 21, 2019) (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any Department
to obtain, retain, access, or use: 1) any Face Recognition Technology; or 2) any information obtained
from Face Recognition Technology.”); Ordinance Amending Oakland Municipal Code Chapter
9.64, (“[P]rohibit the City from acquiring, obtaining, retaining, requesting, or accessing Face
Recognition Software.”); Somerville, Mass., Ordinance 2019-16 (June 27, 2019) (“It shall be
unlawful for Somerville or any Somerville official to obtain, retain, access, or use: (1) [a]ny face
surveillance system; or (2) [a]ny information obtained from a face surveillance system.”).
386. See
Portland,
Or.,
Ordinance
(Nov.
08,
2019),
available
at
https://www.eff.org/files/2019/11/18/434828951-portland-unveils-facial-recognition-banproposal.pdf (“Bureaus shall not acquire, evaluate or use Facial Recognition Technologies . . . [and]
shall not use, access or retain any information derived from Facial Recognition Technologies”); see
also Developing a Facial Recognition Policy in Portland, PORTLAND.GOV (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://beta.portland.gov/bps/news/2019/12/11/developing-facial-recognition-policy-portland
(explaining that a policy regulating FRT-use in the private sector is still at the research stage).
387. Hodges & Mennemeier, supra note 361.
388. Martin, supra note 299.
389. Kaitlin Jackson, Challenging Facial Recognition Software in Criminal Cases, NACDL (2019),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/548c697c-fd8e-4b8d-b4c3-2540336fad94/challenging-facialrecognition-software-in-criminal-court_july-2019.pdf; see also People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d
564,576 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that the evidence that facial recognition technology produces has
value, but it has not been accepted as reliable by relevant scientific communities).
390. Jackson, supra note 390, at 14.
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or eliminate a suspect.”391 Therefore, the defense should learn how to
recognize when FRT might have been used during a criminal
investigation.392 In this regard, the defense may present a viable
challenge when facial recognition evidence is used to make an arrest
without probable cause or in cases involving the arrest of the wrong
person.393
Defense counsel should consider the possibility that the police used
FRT to identify a suspect whenever there is a possibility of
misidentification because the defendant was suspected of committing the
offense from the initiation of the investigation, if there was a photo or
video of the incident, or if there was an eyewitness to the event.394 If the
answer is yes to any of these questions, defense counsel should try to
ascertain whether FRT was used.395 This may involve a simple phone call
to the prosecutor asking for clarification or the issuance of a discovery
demand depending on the law in the jurisdiction.396 This is important
because the disclosure of facial recognition use may not be forthcoming
since the government rarely intends to introduce the algorithm results at
trial.397
Lynch v. State of Florida provides an example of where the defendant
unsuccessfully tried to obtain the algorithm images. This matter involved
the discovery of photographs generated by a facial recognition system of
potential suspects other than the defendant.398 The facts show that an
undercover officer purchased crack cocaine from a person known as
“Midnight.”399 During the purchase, an officer used his cell phone to take
a picture of Midnight who was leaning into the car.400 Subsequently, the
officer sent the picture to a crime analyst who provided the police with
the defendant’s name and photograph as the result of database searches
generated by the use of a facial recognition program.401
At trial, the defendant demanded that the government produce the other
pictures in the databases of the people who were also known as
“Midnight.”402 The court denied the request as being irrelevant and the
defendant was found guilty. The defendant then asserted that the facial
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

People v. Carrington, No. B265888, 2018 WL 671903, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).
Jackson, supra note 390, at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 20.
Lynch v. State, 260 So.3d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
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recognition software had returned other pictures as possible matches. He
contended that those pictures would have cast doubt on the state’s case
and that the government’s failure to produce the images was a violation
of Brady v. Maryland.403
The court rejected this argument because there was no reasonable
probability that the trial results would have been any different if such a
disclosure had been made.404 The defendant could not show that the other
pictures in the database resembled him to cause a misidentification nor
could he show that anyone in those pictures would have been the
culprit.405
F.

Court Cases involving FRT

The government will rarely attempt to use the results of facial
recognition software as the sole evidence in a criminal case. Rather, it is
merely a tool that helps to develop other evidence and thus few criminal
cases are devoted to the topic. Usually, discussions about facial
recognition are in the context of a piece of evidence in the chain that led
to the identification of a suspect. As noted in People v. Carrington,
FRT is in its infancy and the science is evolving, as well as its reliability
and accuracy.406 At present, the government does not use FRT as “the
sole basis to identify or eliminate a suspect.”407
In a civil litigation context, FRT might arise in an invasion of privacy
claim, or as a violation of a regulation of biometric technology against
entities such as Shutterfly, Facebook, Microsoft, Google and other
businesses that use FRT.
A Westlaw search using the words “facial recognition technology”
disclosed 73 criminal and civil matters.408 While the Fourth Amendment
protects citizens against unreasonable searches, it is uncertain whether
having images of the people’s faces run through facial recognition
systems constitutes a search. Like license plate readers, body-worn
cameras and drones, FRT falls into a “constitutional grey area.”409
Existing case law, however, sheds some light on the possible outcomes
once the issue inevitably reaches the Supreme Court. The next sections
will provide examples of arguments that could be used in criminal cases
to keep any reference about FRT out of evidence or permit its mention at
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Lynch, 260 So.3d at 1170.
Id.
Carrington, 2018 WL 671903, at *11.
Id.
This search was conducted by the authors on February 22, 2020.
Garvie et al., supra note 311.
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the time of trial.
1. Cases That Would Support the Use of FRT in Court
U.S. v. Dionisio presents a Supreme Court analogy that would allow
facial recognition technology to be a permissible police tool. This case
dealt with a constitutional challenge to a grand jury subpoena requesting
voice recordings from twenty individuals for identification purposes.410
Dionisio and other witnesses refused to provide a voice recording and
argued that being compelled to do so would violate their Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.411 The Supreme Court found that a person does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy over physical characteristics that
he exposes to the public.412 “No person can have a reasonable expectation
that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can
reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”413 The
Court also opined that no valid Fifth Amendment claim had been raised
since the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits compelling
communications, not forcing a person to submit a photograph or to speak
for identification purposes.414
Moreover, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”415 In Smith, the Government installed a pen
register in the offices of a telephone company that was used to record the
telephone numbers the defendant dialed.416 Smith argued that he expected
this information to remain private; but the Court disagreed.417 The Court
explained that when a person shares telephone numbers with a telephone
company for business purposes, he cannot expect these numbers to remain
a secret.418 The judges essentially determined that a person assumes the
risk “in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government.”419
410. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 3 (1973).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 14.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 6 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
415. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
416. Id. at 737.
417. Id. at 743-44.
418. Id. at 744.
419. Id. But see 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (overruling Smith by requiring a court order to install a pen
register). “However, evidence obtained in violation of the statute can be admitted in criminal trials
because violation of the statute does not result in an unconstitutional search and Congress did not
provide for exclusion of evidence for violation of the statute.” United States v. Allen, No. ACM
32727, 1999 WL 305093, at *6 (A.F. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 1999) (citing United States v. Thompson,
936, F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991)).
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Because the databases accessed by FRT are filled with photos
voluntarily provided for licensing, employment, immigration, and other
purposes, the third-party doctrine could be used to support the argument
that the photos are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court eventually moved on from recognizing that certain
information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment to determining
that the use of certain technology to gather such information does not
constitute a search. In U.S. v Knotts, the Supreme Court found that using
warrantless monitoring of a beeper to track the defendant’s movements
did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights since there was
no legitimate expectation of privacy.420 The Supreme Court explained
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the police from
“augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”421
This decision suggests that FRT is merely another piece of permissible
sensory-augmenting technology as it merely does something that the
naked eye could do: look at two images and determine whether they
portray the same person.
2. Cases That Would Oppose the Use of FRT in Court
The following are some of the cases suggesting that the use of FRT
would violate the Constitution. Although a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy over his facial characteristics, some
scholars rely on the two-prong test in Katz v. Untied States to argue that
a person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy over his
identity.422 Under Katz, a violation of the Fourth Amendment only occurs
when it can be shown that a subjective expectation of privacy is present,
and that expectation is one that society acknowledges as being objectively
reasonable.423 The first prong of this test is satisfied because although
people may expose their facial characteristics to the public, they often do
not volunteer identifying information. The second prong is also fulfilled
because the Supreme Court has made it clear that an expectation of
privacy is reasonable if it is “established by general social norms.”424
Polls reveal that 60% of Americans feel that they should be able to be out
in public without being identified and 93% believe that they should be
able to control who obtains information about them, so it is not hard to

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 282.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967).
Id. at 361.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981).
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categorize privacy over our identity as a social norm.425
The capabilities of the technology itself and the fact that FRT is not in
general circulation can be used to argue that the use of FRT constitutes a
search. For instance, in Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court
determined that law enforcement officials had performed an unlawful
search when they relied upon thermal imaging technology not available
for use by the general public to gather information about the inside of a
house.426 Similarly, FRT can only be used by law enforcement and large
companies capable of compiling a database of pictures. 427 It could even
be argued that FRT is used to view the bone structure underneath our skin
“since that is what facial recognition software can essentially do: create a
digital wireframe, or skeleton, of a person’s face.”428
While Kyllo addressed information-gathering technology that could
have only been obtained through a physical intrusion, the Supreme Court
has also addressed technology that gathers publicly available information.
In United States v. Jones, Justice Alito suggested that a GPS device does
more than augment the senses, since it allows law enforcement to do
things that would otherwise be impracticable.429 Although law
enforcement could have followed the defendant, doing so for a month
would have been costly, difficult, and impractical.430 Similarly in
Carpenter v. United States, the Court described the collection of cell-site
location information as inescapable and automatic because, unlike a nosy
neighbor, GPS devices “are ever alert, and their memory is nearly
infallible.”431
These cases suggest that the Court could find that FRT, unlike the
beeper that signaled the presence of an automobile to a police receiver in
Knotts, does more than augment “the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth.”432

425. Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Places: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Against the
Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1613 (2017).
426. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
427. With 350 million pictures being uploaded into Facebook and 95 million pictures being
uploaded into Instagram every day, these platforms have access to over 290 billion pictures. Sean
O’ Hagan, What Next for Photography in the Age of Instagram, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2018/oct/14/future-photography-in-the-age-ofinstagram-essay-sean-o-hagan.
428. Elizabeth Snyder, “Faceprints” and the Fourth Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial
Recognition Technology to Conduct Unlawful Searches, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 268 (2018).
429. Elizabeth E. John, Artificial Intelligence and Policing: Hints in the Carpenter Decision, 16
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 281, 287 (2018).
430. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429-30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that
this type of surveillance would have required several agents, multiple vehicles, and aerial assistance,
which are resources that would have been reserved for cases of unusual importance).
431. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
432. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 282-83 (1983).
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3. First Amendment Concerns with FRT
There is also disagreement as to whether FRT may infringe on a
person’s First Amendment rights. In Laird v. Tatum, Vietnam War
protestors argued that the government disregarded their First Amendment
rights when Army surveillance tracked those who attended public
meetings and kept a record of those who spoke.433 The Supreme Court
held that no valid claim had been presented since the government’s
surveillance did not have a deterrent effect.434 The Court explained that
the protestors’ claim was based on the existence of the government’s datagathering system, and the Court refused to recognize that a deterrent
effect could arise “merely from the individual’s knowledge that a
governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual’s concomitant fear that . . . the agency might in the future take
some other and additional action detrimental to that individual.”435 Laird,
therefore, suggests that using FRT to identify those in attendance at public
events does not raise any First Amendment concerns.
However, some cases suggest that anonymity is a necessary safeguard
to guarantee freedom of speech and association. For instance, in NAACP
v. Alabama, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) refused to comply with a court order directing it to
produce, among other things, a list of its members.436 The Supreme Court
recognized that there is a vital relationship between privacy and the
freedom to associate, and therefore found that the court order would
restrain the right of NAACP members to exercise such freedom.437 The
Court explained that complying with the court order could result in
members withdrawing and dissuade others from joining out of fear that
their beliefs would be exposed.438
Similarly, in Talley v. California, the Court found that an ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of handbills unless they included the name and
address of the person distributing them restricted freedom of
expression.439 The Court explained that persecuted groups have used
anonymity to criticize oppressive practices and laws, and “identification
and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussion of public
matters of importance.”440
Talley and NAACP provide the basis for arguing that FRT infringes on
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
Id. at 11.
Id.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
Id. at 462.
Id. at 463.
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
Id. at 64-65.
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a person’s First Amendment rights. When FRT is combined with other
forms of technology, it identifies individuals in attendance at protests,
political rallies and religious ceremonies in real-time.441 This would
discourage attendance by those critical of the government and those who
hold unpopular opinions out of fear that they will be identified and be
subject to negative repercussions. After all, people tend to alter their
behavior when they know or suspect that they are being watched.442
Although FRT technology is being employed by law enforcement to carry
out important responsibilities, it could come at the high cost of selfcensorship.
4. Lower Court Cases Involving FRT
There are several lower court cases in which FRT played some role in
the litigation. The earliest ruling allowing the use of facial recognition
evidence occurred in San Francisco in 2011.443 The case involved a
defendant who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to twentyfive years in jail. The trial judge allowed the biometric proof to be
admitted as evidence, which helped to exonerate the accused. The impact
of FRT in this case surprised many legal professionals since the
technology is still novel.444
Facial recognition software was used to help identify a criminal
defendant when the video recording of an assault was posted on
Facebook. In the case of In re the Interest of K.M., A Minor, the defendant
contended that his conviction for aggravated assault and conspiracy was
improper because he was only a bystander to the incident.445 The evidence
demonstrated that the victim was walking home from school when he was
confronted by the defendant and his accomplices. The defendant filmed
the encounter between the victim and his co-conspirators in which the
student was punched and kicked for no reason.446 The video was then
posted on YouTube and the police identified the defendant through facial
recognition software on Facebook. The suspect was arrested and his

441. In 2016, nine out of thirty-eight body-worn-camera manufacturers had incorporated facial
recognition technology into their units or were contemplating it. Katelyn Ringrose, Law
Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates
Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 60 (2019).
442. See Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RES. CENTER 4 (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://perma.cc/D54F-G343 (noting that after learning about NSA surveillance from Edward
Snowden’s revelation, 22% of America adults changed their online behavior).
443. A First: Biometrics Used to Sentence Criminal, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Feb. 1,
2011), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/first-biometrics-used-sentence-criminal.
444. Id.
445. In re K.M., No. 2721 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 7354644 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2015).
446. Id.
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phone, which was seized under a warrant, contained the video of the
fight.447 The court upheld the identification and properly adjudged the
juvenile delinquent since his phone's camera was running before the
assault. The running camera suggested that the attack was planned and
that the parties were working together moments before the assault,
thereby creating the inference that they agreed that one or more of them
would participate in the confrontation.448
Geiger v. Maryland involved theft by deception.449 The facts show that
a tire store employee received a call from a Brian Johnson requesting tires
for his car. The next day, Johnson went to the store and orally provided
his credit card number, since he claimed that he did not have the card with
him.450 As an additional measure of identification, he produced a North
Carolina driver’s license that contained his picture. It turned out that the
credit card was stolen, and the driver’s license was fake.451 Johnson’s
picture from the license was run through a database and facial recognition
software matched it to a Maryland driver’s license. The judge was shown
both pictures at trial, and the court determined that they showed the same
man.452
During the testimony of the investigating detective, the state offered
into evidence a copy of the Maryland picture that was located though
FRT. The defense vigorously protested the picture’s introduction but the
trial judge ruled that the defendant “doesn’t have a right to protect his
image,” and it was defense counsel who mentioned facial recognition
technology in the first place.453 The court opined that no error had been
committed because the computerized identification was not being used as
evidence but was simply a guide used by the detective to put the
investigation ”on the right track.”454 At no time did the detective testify
in any manner about FRT and the state never questioned him about facial
profiling.455 Therefore, when utilized to direct the investigation, the use
of FRT technology did not invalidate the defendant’s conviction.456
In United States v. Gibson, the defendant secured a Florida driver’s
license under the false name of Gregory Gibson.457 He then applied for a
447. Id.
448. Id. at 6.
449. Geiger v. Maryland, 174 A.3d 954, 956 (Md. 2017).
450. Id. at 956.
451. Id. at 957.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 964.
454. Id. at 965.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. United States v. Gibson, No. 8:00-CR-442-T-27AEP, 2016 WL 845272, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
4, 2016).
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passport and submitted a false application under the fictitious name. The
application was flagged as fraudulent and the authorities tried to locate
the defendant to no avail.458 Several years later, an analyst conducted a
facial recognition check and linked the fake picture to the driver’s license
of Anthony Lazzara. This individual was arrested at the address listed on
the valid license.459 A subsequent fingerprint search revealed a host of
aliases and a criminal record linked to the defendant.460
The defendant objected to the time delay between when he submitted
the false passport application and his trial.461 His motion to dismiss the
case as a violation of the right to a speedy trial, however, was denied. The
court noted that the defendant caused the delay by using various aliases
and false identifications.462 This deception thwarted his apprehension
through traditional investigative tools such as the fingerprint database.
The agent further stated that he did not have initial access to FRT because
of privacy concerns.463 Therefore, any delay on the part of the government
was considered a slight negligence at the worst and the defendant did not
suffer any prejudice.464
Montanez v. Department of Transportation involves a suspension of a
driver’s license in Pennsylvania. In Montanez, facial recognition
software determined that the defendant had obtained a driver's license
using a false identity.465 The driver had received multiple citations over a
period of time from 2006 to 2010 under the name of DeLeon. He used the
name Montanez to obtain a different license in 2013 as well as a
commercial driver’s license in 2016. In 2017, Montanez renewed his
driver's license and the Department of Transportation used facial
recognition software to compare driver's license pictures to others in the
government’s database.466 At this time, the Department of Transportation
learned that DeLeon and Montanez were the same person. While the court
never discussed the use of FRT, it upheld the suspension of the license
because of the fraud perpetrated by the defendant—which necessarily
rested on the use of FRT.467
In the case of In re Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland,
two individuals were suspected of engaging in extortion via Facebook
458. Id. at *2.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at *1.
462. Id. at *2.
463. Id. at *3.
464. Id..
465. Montanez v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 1150 C.D. 2018, 2019 WL 2997381, at *2 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2019).
466. Id.
467. Id. at *4-5.
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Messenger.468 The Government sought to seize the electronic devices
located at the suspects’ residence, and the court found that the facts in the
affidavit supported a finding of probable cause.469 However, the
Government also sought to compel any individuals located at the
residence to use their biometric features (such as a fingerprint or a facial
scan) to unlock the electronic devices to search their contents.470 The
Court found that this subsequent request violated the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.471
The Court reached this conclusion by first noting that courts have
previously held that suspects cannot be compelled to provide the passcode
for an electronic device.472 The Court recognized that while some acts
could qualify as testimonial “if conceding the existence, possession, and
control, and authenticity of the documents tended to incriminate them,”
other acts such as providing a blood sample or a fingerprint did not
constitute a communication.473 The Court finally concluded that
compelling the use of biometric features to unlock a device was not akin
to compelling someone to submit to fingerprinting or provide a DNA
sample for two reasons.474 First, biometric features in these types of cases
serve the same purpose as a passcode, so if a person cannot be compelled
to provide his or her passcode the person cannot be compelled to use their
biometric features.475 Second, while compelling someone to submit to
fingerprinting merely confirms whether he or she is the source of physical
evidence,476 compelling someone to use biometric features to unlock a
device confirms ownership or control of the device as well as control or
significant connection to its contents.477
FRT has also been addressed in civil suits against private entities. In
Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc, several individuals sued Shutterfly for
collecting and using their facial geometry without their consent in

468. In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. See id. at 1013-14 (explaining that the court also found that the Government’s request violated
the Fourth Amendment because it was not limited to a particular person or device and the
Government could not be allowed to search a non-suspect’s device simply because they are present
during a lawful search).
472. Id. at 1015 (“The expression of the content of an individual’s mind falls squarely within the
protection of the Fifth Amendment.”).
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 1015-16.
476. Id. at 1016.
477. See id. (“With a touch of a finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has accessed the phone
before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint password capabilities, and that he or she currently
has some level of control over or relatively significant connection to the phone and its contents.”).
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violation of Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).478
Shutterfly moved to dismiss the complaint by claiming that BIPA did not
cover facial geometry obtained from photos and that plaintiffs failed to
allege actual damages.479 Guided by the statutory definitions, the court
concluded that a facial scan did not constitute “biometric information,”480
but did constitute a “biometric identifier.”481 The court explained that a
facial scan was referenced in the definition of “biometric identifier,”482
and limiting these scans to those obtained in person was not supported by
the statute’s purpose of “protecting privacy in the face of emerging
biometric technology.”483 As for Shutterfly’s second claim, the court
found that BIPA does not require a showing of actual damages to state a
claim.484 The court reached this conclusion by noting that other statutes
have been interpreted to allow recovery without a showing of actual
damages.485
In Patel v. Facebook, Inc. several website users filed suit against
Facebook, claiming that the social media giant used facial-recognition
technology without complying with BIPA.486 The case involves
Facebook’s feature known as “Tag Suggestions”. If activated, Facebook
may use FRT to ascertain whether the customer’s friends are contained in
pictures uploaded by that user. If a picture is downloaded, FRT will scan
the image to see if it includes any faces of known people.487 If known
people are present in the image, the software detects the geometric data
points that generate a face signature or a map. The software then compares
the face signature to other images in the company’s database of user face
templates. If a match is found, Facebook informs the user to tag the person
in the picture.488
Facebook filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing
because the plaintiffs had not claimed any identifiable injury. This motion
was denied and an appeal was taken of that determination.489 In upholding
this decision, and certifying the matter as a class action, the 9 th Circuit
found that “an invasion of an individual's biometric privacy rights has a
478. Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 15, 2017).
479. Id. at *5.
480. Id. at *7.
481. Id. at *14.
482. Id. at *8.
483. Id. at *14.
484. Id. at *26.
485. Id. at *23-25.
486. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 126, 1267 (9th Cir. 2019).
487. Id. at 1268.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 1269-70.
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close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as
providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”490 Once
Facebook creates a face template of that person, the potential uses are
endless. The company can use the information to tag the user in the
hundreds of millions of photos uploaded to Facebook each day and
identify whether the person’s Facebook friends are also present in the
picture.491 According to the court, Facebook's assemblage, use, and
storage of customer’s facial templates is the very harm contemplated by
the statute.492 Facebook appealed this adverse ruling to the Supreme
Court, but the Court denied certiorari .493
On January 30, 2020, Facebook settled this claim for $550 million,
marking one of the largest settlements ever made in a privacy lawsuit.494
Paul Geller--one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs-- admitted he
was “hopeful that this case is a turning point for privacy litigation.
Technology is advancing at a rapid pace, and corporations need to realize
that they better tread carefully when it comes to recognizing, tracking and
monitoring us.”495
Google is currently facing a similar lawsuit in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleges that Google
violated BIPA by collecting biometric identifiers through its photosharing cloud service without written consent from users.496 Specifically,
the complaint states that Google used FRT to create face templates and
that “each face template that Google extracts is unique to a particular
individual, in the same way that a fingerprint or voiceprint uniquely
identifies one and only one person.”497 The suit seeks $5,000 for each
BIPA violation and an injunction to stop Google from continuing this
practice.498

490. Id. at 1273.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 1275.
493. Nathan Freed Wessler, A Federal Court Sounds the Alarm of the Privacy Harms of Face
Recognition Technology, ACLU (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/federal-court-sounds-alarm-privacy-harms-face.
494. Thomas Germain, Facebook Settles $550 Million Facial Recognition Lawsuit, CONSUMER
REP. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/lawsuits-settlements/facebook-settlesfacial-recognition-lawsuit/.
495. Id. at *3.
496. Ross Todd, Google Hit with Class Action under Illinois Biometric Privacy Law over Facial
Recognition, LAW.COM (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/02/07/google-hitwith-class-action-under-illinois-biometric-privacy-law-over-facial-recognition/.
497. Lauren Berg, Google Accused of Collecting User ‘Face Prints’ from Photos, LAW360 (Feb. 7,
2020, 5:14PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1241866/google-accused-of-collecting-userface-prints-from-photos.
498. Id.
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Court Cases involving FRT in Other Countries

The struggle over the use of FRT is not limited to the United States. A
British court recently found that the use of FRT by police is lawful,
thwarting the efforts to limit FRT by an activist concerned about the
tool’s implications for privacy.499 The opinion was decided while a
worldwide debate concerning the growing use of FRT was taking
place.500 Advances in artificial intelligence have made it simpler for law
enforcement to automatically scan faces and promptly match those
images to "watch lists" of suspects, missing people and those of interest,
but the technology also presents apprehension about mass surveillance.501
The Plaintiff in the British case claimed that the police scanned his face
twice as it assessed the technology. The first instance occurred while he
was Christmas shopping and the second when he was at a protest.502 The
plaintiff asserted that “[t]his sinister technology undermines our privacy
and I will continue to fight against its unlawful use to ensure our rights
are protected and we are free from disproportionate government
surveillance."503 The court disagreed, stating that the use of facial
recognition technology by the police was consistent with British human
rights and data privacy laws because the images and biometric data of
those who were not a match on the "watch list" were promptly deleted.504
The court did note, however, that its legal analysis should be periodically
reviewed.505
In Canada, the Ontario Court of Justice considered a case involving
facial recognition technology in R. v. Voong.506 The defendant was
arrested after FRT identified him as having seven fraudulent driver’s
licenses in the Ministry of Transport database.507 In the past, three of these
license cardholders had failed to appear in court for traffic violations so
the Crown had charged Mr. Voong for possession of fraudulent driver’s
license possession under the Canadian Highway Traffic Act.508 The
defendant asserted that the evidence was obtained through an
499. Kelvin Chan, Activist Loses UK Court Case on Police Fascial Recognition, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 4, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/activist-loses-uk-court-casepolice-facial-recognition-65378750.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. R. v. Voong, 2018 ONCJ 352 (Can.).
507. Ali Imrie, Ontario Court of Justice: Facial Recognition Technology of Driver’s License
Photos Not a Privacy Violation, RIGHTS WATCH BLOG, CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASS’N (Feb. 6,
2018), http://rightswatch.ca/2018/06/02/18391/.
508. Id.
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unreasonable search according to the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.509
The Ontario Court of Justice disagreed and noted that the Charter did
not apply to pictures and materials provided with the driver’s license
application since there were no relevant privacy considerations.510 The
Ministry of Transport has the authority to disclose information in its files
to other agencies. Therefore, the defendant has no reasonable expectation
of privacy and his rights were not violated.511
One Russian court has rejected a claim to ban FRT.512 A woman, Alena
Popova, was involved in a sexual harassment protest in Moscow in 2018.
Subsequently, she was fined for protesting after being identified through
FRT.513 This government action prompted her to sue the Moscow police
claiming that they were “indiscriminately” collecting biometric
information through facial recognition software without consent.514 The
court dismissed the claim. The police maintained that Popova had no
proof that FRT was used to identify her.515 It should be noted that this
case comes at a time that Moscow is planning to expand its use of FRT as
its mounts 160,000 cameras around the city, making it one of the largest
users of FRT in the world.516 This move has prompted objections by
several organizations. For instance, Amnesty International has criticized
the plan to expand the utilization of facial-recognition systems, saying
their anticipated use in Moscow during public assemblies will “inevitably
have a chilling effect” on protesters.517
Chinese courts were asked to address FRT use for the first time just last
year. A Chinese law professor sued a wildlife park after being required to
scan his face to enter the park.518 The law professor was an annual passholder who learned that the park had replaced its fingerprint identification
system with a facial recognition system.519 Annual pass-holders who
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Emily Sherwin & Elena Barysheva, Russian Court Rejects Call to Ban Facial Recognition
Technology, DW(June 1, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/russian-court-rejects-call-to-ban-facialrecognition-technology/a-51135814.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Watchdog Warns About ‘Chilling Effect’ of Russia’s Use of Facial-Recognition Technology,
RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.rferl.org/a/watchdog-warnsabout-chilling-effect-of-russia-s-use-of-facial-recognition-technology/30410014.html.
518. Shan Li, Chinese Professor Files Rare Lawsuit Over Use of Facial-Recognition Technology,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2019, 12:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-professor-files-rarelawsuit-over-use-of-facial-recognition-technology-11572884626.
519. Id.
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refused to undergo a facial scan were not allowed into the park and were
not reimbursed for the value of their membership.520 According to the
lawsuit, this violated China’s consumer protection law since it forced
customers to provide biometric information without their consent.521
Although the law professor is seeking a refund for his membership, he
claims to have filed the lawsuit primarily to “raise awareness about the
problems that come from the unregulated collection of personal data and
to call for increased regulation and compliance.”522
China does not have laws regulating the collection, storage, and use of
information gathered through FRT despite being one of the biggest users
of this technology.523 The Chinese government is known to support
companies that develop FRT to bolster commerce and ensure public
safety.524 FRT is widely used in Chinese airports, railway stations, offices,
campuses and residential buildings.525 China also uses the technology to
arrest jaywalkers and those who commit other summary offenses.526
Although there was a “public willingness to surrender some privacy in
exchange for the safety and convenience,” concerns have risen after it was
reported that facial data was being sold online for as little as $1.40.527 A
new law requiring phone service providers to scan the faces of new
customers has also led some to speculate that the government is using
FRT to keep track of its population.528 Many are now calling for a ban on
FRT use, and the outcome of this lawsuit could lead the government to
devise laws that regulate how private companies and law enforcement use
the technology.529
V. CONCLUSION
This article aims to show the extent to which law enforcement relies
upon recent developments in camera surveillance, automated license plate
readers, drones, and facial recognition systems to carry out its duties.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. China Facial Recognition Case Puts Big Brother on Trial, HONG KING FREE PRESS (Jan 12,
2020), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2020/01/12/china-facial-recognition-case-puts-big-brothertrial/.
524. Id.
525. A Lawsuit Against face-scan in China Could Have Big Consequences, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9,
2019), https://www.economist.com/china/2019/11/09/a-lawsuit-against-face-scans-in-china-couldhave-big-consequences.
526. Martin, supra note 299.
527. China Facial Recognition Case Puts Big Brother on Trial, supra note 524.
528. Sam Shead, Chinese Residents Worry About the Rise of Facial Recognition, BBC (Dec. 5,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50674909.
529. Li, supra note 519.
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Unfortunately, laws regulating these various forms of technology have
not been able to keep pace with developments, and law enforcement has
been able to utilize digital advances with few restrictions. Although this
technology offers a vast array of benefits, it is important to be mindful
that these digital developments may infringe on the Constitutional rights
of citizens. Some state legislatures and lower courts have taken steps to
safeguard or minimize this intrusion, but the degree to which the civil
liberties of citizens are protected should not depend upon the state in
which they live. Rather than waiting for the Supreme Court to resolve the
various constitutional issues raised by this new technology, Congress
should enact legislation that ensures the use of these digital advancements
is limited, transparent, and accurate. These systems are only going to
become more sophisticated over time and the government will be able to
monitor the minute-by-minute movements of its citizens with relative
ease. Therefore, safeguards need to be implemented so that members of
society do not feel like Big Brother is watching at every corner and turn.
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